MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS in THE ERA OF AID FRAGMENTATION

Transcription

1 1818 Society Water Group Luncheons --- MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS in THE ERA OF AID FRAGMENTATION THE CASE OF HOUSING POLICY TRANSFERS 30 April 2010 Bertrand RENAUD V April Bertrand RENAUD. 30 April Society

2 OUTLINE CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FOR HOUSING THE ROAD TRAVELED BY MFIs IN HOUSING POLICY STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO POLICY TRANSFERS AID FRAGMENTATION: A STARTLING CHALLENGE

3 CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FOR HOUSING: - WORLD URBANIZATION AT ITS PEAK RATE - COSTS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

4 THE WORLD IS NOW MORE URBAN THAN RURAL UN- Dept of Econ & Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects. The 2007 Revision, FIG

5 RISING URBAN SHARES OF ASIA AND AFRICA EVOLVING REGIONAL SHARES OF TOTAL URBAN POPULATION to 2050 UN- Dept of Econ & Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects. The 2007 Revision. FIG 1.4 5

6 TRADING PLACES: G-7 versus EM-7 CHANGING CONTRIBUTIONS TO ANNUAL GDP GROWTH (N.B. These are NOT shares of World GDP. In 2007 G-7 = 53% of World GDP, EM-7= 21%) Source: Finance and Development, IMF 6

7 COSTS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

8 GLOBAL HOUSING PRICE BOOM AND BUST McKinsey Global Institute, 6 th Annual Financial Report, Sept

9 MASSIVE CONTRACTION OF CROSS-BORDER CAPITAL FLOWS IN

10 MASSIVE WEALTH LOSSES,

11 NON-LINEAR HOUSING SHARE OF GNP DURING DEVELOPMENT (Percent of GNP) Source: Housing: Enabling Markets to Work, World Bank Policy Paper 1993, Figure S-10 11

12 DECLINE OF HOUSING INVESTMENT DURING GLOBAL SLOWDOWNS. HOW DEEP AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION of ? Source: Housing: Enabling Markets to Work, World Bank Policy Paper 1993, Figure S-11 12

13 EXAMPLE OF COLOMBIA: TWO LARGE HOUSING SHOCKS. UPAC Crisis of 1999, Global Crisis of LA OFERTA DE VIVIENDA EN BOGOTÁ-SOACHA Iniciaciones de vivienda formal, ,000 Crisis UPAC 56,773 50,000 40,000 30,000 42,201 31,672 20,000 10,000 13,978 16,313 3,522 - Mar.93 Sep.94 Mar.96 Sep.97 Mar.99 Sep.00 Mar.02 Sep.03 Mar.05 Sep.06 Mar.08 Sep.09 Total Unidades Iniciadas Unidades iniciadas VIS Unidades iniciadas VIP Fuente: CAMACOL. Cálculos: Economía Urbana Ltda. Entre 1993 y 2009 se iniciaron en Bogotá-Soacha cerca de 549 mil viviendas formales; 35% del total del país. Desde 2005 se han construido anualmente en promedio 5.5 viviendas por cada mil habitantes. Source: Jose Miguel Silva, IDB Housing conference, 7 Dec Bertrand RENAUD. 24 March DELFT

14 SHIFT TO A LOWER GLOBAL GROWTH PATH Economist: Special Report on the Global Economy, 3 October

15 THE ROAD TRAVELED BY MFIs IN HOUSING POLICY

16 (VERY) BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS Precursors (Since Von Thünen 1826) Urban Economics (Alonso, Mills, Muth, others) Housing Economics (EHAP ) New Trade and New Geography (Krugman) Housing Finance (Finance and IT revolutions) Property Rights (De Soto, Post-Soviet revival) New Synthesis Adapted from Steve Malpezzi

17 WORLD BANK HISTORY IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT Many projects have some urban character Projects called urban began in 1972, with Senegal sites and services and slum upgrading Integrated urban development (70s) Housing finance (80s) Policy-based lending (90s) Impact of aid fragmentation and multiplying global concerns? Rise of networks Adapted from Steve Malpezzi

18 HOUSING: ENABLING MARKETS TO WORK (WB POLICY PAPER, 1993) SHIFT FROM A PROJECT TO A SYSTEM-WIDE PERSPECTIVE: What makes housing affordable? Can social housing programs for the poor ever be sustained as long as the housing system is seriously distorted? (Usually, with supply side distortions). Is the current housing system a de facto vehicle for wealth redistribution? Does a country s future improve with rising income and wealth inequality? IMPLICATIONS: Housing is an asset, and an important one. Governments should abandon direct housing production and focus on an enabling role. Define and adjudicate property rights Develop market based systems of mortgage finance Rationalize subsidies Provide appropriate infrastructure Regulate appropriately Consider the industrial organization of the housing market Adapted from Steve Malpezzi S. Angel comments

19 SEVEN PILLARS OF HOUSING DEMAND-SIDE 1. PROPERTY RIGHTS Are integrated and enforceable property rights easily tradable? Is there a tenure choice? Do rent controls and other price controls distort property rights? 2. HOUSING FINANCE SERVICES Are competitive banking services for housing available? Are there distorting special circuits based on a mix of special privileges and government constraints? Is the retail mortgage finance system linked to capital markets? 3. TAXATION and SUBSIDIES Is there a system of well targeted subsidies? are subsidies the cumulative result of piecemeal ad hoc decisions? Are target groups the right ones? Are subsidies financed on budget? Are subsidies separated from credit services? SUPPLY-SIDE 4. SUPPLY OF SERVICED URBAN LAND and INFRASTRUCTURE What is the process for rural-urban land conversion? How is local infrastructure planned, financed and provided? How clear is the division of labor between public and private sector operators in the supply of serviced urban land? 5. LAND USE AND ZONING REGULATIONS Are local regulatory frameworks for land development and land use raising the price of housing for middle and low income families? Are urban planning decisions arbitrary or are they consistent with land use market efficiency? 6. ORGANIZATION OF THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY Is there a complete institutional framework to manage risks in the competitive construction and real estate industry? Do timely and reliable housing and real estate information systems exist? GOVERNMENTS 7. ENABLING ROLE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, IMPLEMENTING ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Is the national government providing a stable legal and regulatory enabling framework? Are autonomous and innovative local governments insuring a balanced and diversified supply of housing? 19

20 DOMINANT FACTORS IN TRANSFERABILITY 1. QUALITY OF NATIONAL POLICIES 2. CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE 3. STAGE / STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

21 POOR POLICY ENVIRONMENTS BEGET LARGE INFORMAL ECONOMIES Source: Economist, Economic and Financial Indicators. See Schneider 2009, data on 160 countries. 21

22 When infrastructure services are absent the costs are large: THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PRIVATE INVESTMENTS PEAKS WHEN PUBLIC INVESTMENT IS AROUND 40% OF TOTAL INVESTMENT Source: Isham and Kaufmann, The forgotten rationale for policy reforms, April1998, World Bank. (NB: BMP Means Black Market Premium over regulated interest rates. ERR: real economic rate of return). 22

23 SHARED CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIES ( Growth Commission 2008) Spence Growth Commission,

24 IMPACT OF PERSISTENT LEADERSHIP + SOUND POLICIES: Cheonggyecheon in 1965, Seoul, Korea. Cheonggyecheon in Taken by Kuwabara Sisei. 24

25 IMPACT OF PERSISTENT LEADERSHIP + SOUND POLICIES: Cheonggyecheon in 2007, Seoul, Korea. 25 Bertrand Renaud,

26 CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY DIFFERENT STAGES OF URBANIZATION DIFFERENT HOUSING POLICY NEEDS 1 China, 2025 (64%) Peak Rate of Urbanization 100 % China, 2005 (41%) 50 % urban 1980 (20%) % Mature OECD countries Per Capita Income Industrialization and Urbanization 2 Peak Rate of Housing Investment 2-3 % of GNP 7-9 % of GNP 3-4 % of GNP Housing Investment and Urbanization Level Per Capita Income 3 15%? Over 60 %? Urban Real Estate Assets in National Wealth Per Capita Income 1818 Society, Water Group Luncheon. 30 April 2010

27 AID FRAGMENTATION: A CHALLENGE STARTLING FACTS - ANY SOLUTION: - CENTRALIZED QUALITY CONTROL? - NETWORKS AND WISDOM OF CROW

28 THE DOMINANCE OF MFIs IN CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ENDED IN THE EARLY 1990s. 300 ODA SHARE 2006: 15% 250 Billions of 2005 US$ ODA SHARE 1972: 77% ODA SHARE 1993: 25% 0-50 Year ODA FDI Inflows Bonds Equity Remittances Net flow of funds to developing countries by type (billions of 2005 US dollars), OECD-DAC 2008 survey 28

29 EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF BILATERAL AID PROJECTS SINCE 1990s Source: Owen Barder, Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for better Aid, Center for Global Development Working Paper 185, October 2009, p.28 29

30 ALL AID PROJECTS HAVE DECLINED IN SIZE THE SIZE OF BILATERAL PROJECTS IS VERY SMALL Source: Owen Barder, Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for better Aid, Center for Global Development Working Paper 185, October 2009, p.28 30

31 STARTLING FACTS 280 bilateral donor agencies, 242 multilateral programs, 24 development banks and about 40 UN agencies The number of private foundations is increasing The myriads of NGOs add to the complexity Donors respond to their own constituencies rather than to citizens needs in developing countries Often donors choose to by-pass government structures thereby undermining them At the time of the 2008 OECD-DAC there were an estimated 340,000 development projects around the world The average size of projects by bilateral donors is declining and well below USD 3 million Disparate actors and interests have led to the uncoordinated delivery of aid, putting severe strain on local government systems In any average country only 45% of aid arrives on time Reporting costs imposed on local managers keep expanding (see Tanzania health case) In 2005, Vietnam reported that it received 791 visits (missions) from public donors At the country level, fragmentation is also increasing. WHY IS THIS HAPPENING? WHAT IS THE STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES? FOUR ISSUES. WHAT ARE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS? WHAT MIGHT BE BEST SUITED TO HOUSING POLICY TRANSFERS? 31

32 FOUR INCENTIVE PROBLEMS BEHIND AID FRAGMENTATION: WHAT MODE OF COLLABORATION IS BEST SUITED IN EACH CASE? Source: Owen BARDER, Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for Better Aid, CGD WP185, October 2009, Table 2, p

33 PLANNING? MARKET SOLUTION? PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS, 2005: FIVE COMMITMENTS 33

34 THE RISE OF AID NETWORKS: THE ANSWER TO BETTER TRANSFERS? Source: Economist, Special Survey of Social Networking, 30 January

35 1818 Society, Water Group Luncheon. 30 April 2010 The Network Economy The value of a network goes up as the square of the number of users MARKET Metcalf s Law MARKET Quality of Information MARKET Knowledge Content & Branding NETWORK HUB Winner Take All Situation MARKET Infrastructure e.g. utilities, communication Ability to stay ahead of competition MARKET MARKET Economies of scale & Critical Mass Quality of Governance MARKET MARKET MARKET MARKET MARKET 35

36 NETWORKS IN THE CASE OF HOUSING What do the economics and sociology of networks tell us? Are there critical nodes to be developed in the rising housing networks? Should these nodes match the structure of the seven analytical pillars? Most likely nodes: Private foundations? Universities? Financial institutions? Others? What can we learn from early illustrations? Property rights and land policies: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge Housing Finance: Wharton School, International Housing Finance Program State and local finance: University of Georgia Conditions for the stability and growth of such nodes? Why did CGAP succeed in microfinance? Long term funding Managerial structure independent of the short-term incentives of bilateral donors and managerial micro-incentives within bilateral and multilateral donors Access to high quality human capital Other factors? Such as the one-dimensional character of the innovation? Regarding quality research: would EHAP happen today? Or the City Study? 36

37 THANK YOU