The Building: A 15 story building of Class I (Fireproof) Construction. 55 East 102nd Street, Manhattan:

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1 55 East 102nd Street, Manhattan: In the mid-1990s, there was a fire phenomenon taking place in New York City Housing Authority apartment houses. These fires were called highintensity stairway fires. Fires spread rapidly through stairways with the surface of the walls and ceilings of the stairway appearing to be the only fuel for this rapid, intense fire. The high-intensity fires were started by small fires within the stairways. One of those fires will be highlighted in this essay. The Building: A 15 story building of Class I (Fireproof) Construction. There were two, scissor-type stairways and two elevators in the building. The building was equipped with a standpipe system. It was an apartment house that was owned by the New York City Housing Authority, Carver Houses.

2 The night tour of May 18, 1994 started as a routine tour in East Harlem. Shortly after midnight at 0025 hours on May 19, 1994, Manhattan Fire Dispatchers transmitted box 1279 for a telephone alarm for a reported smoke in the building. Engines 53, 58, 91, Ladders 43, 26, and Battalion 10 were dispatched. 55 E 102 Street front Working in Ladder 43 was Captain Jay Jonas (Cov.), Fr. Ron Brennison, Fr. Jim Yakamovich, Fr. Pete Cooney, Fr. Charles Harris, and Fr. Ron Kirshner. Working in Engine 53 was Lieutenant Pat Waters, Fr. Paul Hughes, Fr. Tom O Connor, Fr. Frank Carrino, and Fr. John Regazzi. Upon arrival at box 1279, there was a noticeable odor of smoke in the street coming from 55 E. 102 Street. Looking up at the upper portions of the building, a large quantity of smoke could be seen at the roof level. As the Forcible Entry Team of Ladder 43 was about to enter the building, the smoke plume at the roof level ignited and a bright orange glow was mixed with the smoke coming off the roof. Fr. Yakimovich was the

3 Outside Vent Firefighter. He went around to the rear to investigate further. He saw that the smoke and flames were at the roof level and he radioed to Captain Jonas of what he saw. Thinking that there was a fire near the roof level, or possibly a fire in the compactor chute, Ladder 43 entered the elevator to make their way to the upper floors of the 15-story building. Members of Ladder 43 stopped the elevator at the 4 th floor to check the compactor shaft for fire. On the 4 th floor, there was a light smoke condition in the hallway, but the compactor shaft was clear. Ladder 43 s Forcible Entry Team searched the 4 th floor looking for the source of the smoke condition. Fr. Ron Kirshner went to the B Stairway and opened the door. The stairway side of the stairway door was a sheet of flame. Once the doorway was opened, a heavy smoke condition banked down to the floor in the hallway of the 4 th floor. The Forcible Entry Team from Ladder 43 realized that they were in a tenuous position with an intense fire burning below them. The Firefighters from Ladder 43 scrambled to find safety from the unusual fire situation. Captain Jonas radioed his Chauffeur Ron Brennison, and told him to transmit a The Firefighters from Ladder 43 crawled to the A-Stairway and found it to be clear. Captain Jonas radioed Lieutenant Pat Waters from Engine 53 and told him that we had a serious fire in the B-Stairway on the lower floors. Lieutenant Waters found the fire on the 2 nd floor landing. He radioed Captain Jonas that it was an overstuffed chair burning on the 2 nd floor. Firefighters from Engine 53 stretched a hand line from the standpipe system outlet on the first floor. They quickly extinguished the fire in the chair. Ladder 26 arrived as the 2 nd due Ladder Company. They proceeded to the upper floors of the building for search. 2nd floor, stairway B

4 They reported a heavy smoke condition on the upper floors of the building. Ladder 26 also reported that the entire stairway above the 2 nd floor had been involved in fire. The fire had blown through the stairway bulkhead. The flame production at this fire was not consistent with the amount of fuel available at the point of origin. The painted surface of the interior of the stairway was peeled, blistered, and charred from the second floor to the interior of the stairway bulkhead. The appearance of the painted surface after the fire indicated that the paint on the walls contributed to the fire. The amount of fire involvement, including the stairway bulkhead, spanned 15 floors. The fire in the stairway above the 2 nd floor (fire origin) was a high-intensity flash fire. The fire quickly moved up the stairs. The fire then self-extinguished after the available fuel was used up. The results of searches in the stairway were negative. However, if anyone was in the stairway at the time of this incident, they would have suffered severe, if not fatal injuries. 826 Columbus Ave heavy charring

5 Author s Note: Captain Jonas wrote a report to Fire Commissioner Howard Safir after this fire. These are his recommendations from his report dated May 20, The Bureau of Fire Prevention should investigate what the Housing Authority is using to paint the walls of the stairways and hallways of these apartment houses. That if the paint being used is questionable, a flame tunnel test should be performed on this substance. That if this substance does contribute fuel to a fire, that it be banned from its present use, and removed from existing walls of stairways and hallways. The initial goal of firefighting forces at a structural fire in a multiple dwelling, is to gain control of the primary means of egress for the occupants of the building. If the primary means of egress is coated with a substance that is flammable, then the danger to the occupants and the firefighting forces is increased. There were numerous stairway/hallway fires throughout the City since On May 22, 1990, a stairway fire at th Avenue. On June 26, 1990, a stairway fire at West 116 Street. On July 18, 1990, a stairway fire at the Marble Hill Development. On August 8, 1990, Chief of Fire Prevention John Toohey wrote to the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) Emanual Popolizio to inform him that combustible paint was suspected as the fuel. Chief Toohey urged him to discontinue use of this substance on the walls.

6 In the span from June 24, 1992 to the fire highlighted in this essay on May 19, 1994, there appeared to be 9 stairway fires in NYCHA buildings. On June 14, 1992, FDNY Deputy Assistant Chief Frank Cruthers wrote to NYCHA Chairman Ruben Franco that these fires were very similar and the painted finish on the walls was the only fuel for these fires. After another fire in the Carey Houses on June 26, 1994, NYCHA and the FDNY met and the NYCHA said that they have assigned this matter the highest priority. After three more high-intensity stairway fires from July 29, 1994 September 3, 1994, Donald Mathews, NYCHA Director of Management, sent a memo to all administrators and managers warning of the fires and direct and immediate inspection be made by project supervisors of all stairway doors and roof landing doors, to ensure that all are operating properly and are self-closing. On September 19, 1994, FDNY Deputy Assistant Chief Frank Cruthers wrote to Roland Diaz, NYCHA Deputy Director for Management of Technical Services, and ordered the immediate cessation of the use of the present paint involved, a systematic frequent inspection of all stairwells, and any new paint selected for use should have FDNY involvement. From October 14, 1994 through October 19, 1995, there were 13 more high-intensity stairway fires in 826 Columbus Ave Exp 1 NYCHA apartment houses. FDNY Chiefs Frank Cruthers and Ralph Palmer continued pressing the NYCHA to discontinue using flammable paint in its stairs and halls. NYCHA contracted out a company called VTEC Laboratories which was located in the Hunts Point section

7 of the Bronx to try to determine what was causing the high-intensity stairway fires. The NYCHA was also working with the National Institute for Standards & Technology to expedite testing of the fire situation. 826 Columbus Ave., fire origin

8 Finally, on November 5, 1995, the unthinkable happened. A rubbish fire was started on the third floor in a stairway at the Frederick Douglass Houses at 826 Columbus Avenue in Manhattan. Manhattan Fire Dispatchers sent FDNY Units to the address at 0107 hours. A high-intensity fire ensued and raced up the 17 story stairway. Lillian Rivera, 42 years old, and Jose Torres, 57 years old, were trapped in the stairway on the 9 th floor. They were six floors away from the floor of origin. Deputy Fire Commissioner William Feehan stated: The victims were sitting on the stairs and never got up. That tells me that the flames came up to them without warning. They both suffered fatal burns. A second alarm was transmitted before the fire was declared Under Control at 0152 hours. 55 E 102 St Exp 4 On February 5, 1996, Mayor Rudolph Guiliani announced that the City would start removing the paint from the stairs and halls by sandblasting them. The cost of the paint removal would be about 100 million dollars and would take years to complete. There were 32 highintensity fires in stairs and halls of NYCHA buildings from 1990 through 1995.

9 Stairways are our base for all firefighting operations. Stairways are where we gain access to upper floors. It is where we stretch our hose lines to mount an attack on a fire. It is where occupants who are trapped above a fire try their escape. It is how we vent vertically at a fire. It is also what we use to gain access to floors above a fire. The different types of stairways are: Open and unenclosed; enclosed; and fire towers. Combustible buildings, such as private dwellings and tenements have open and unenclosed stairways (unless there is a major renovation). High rise multiple dwellings have enclosed stairways which have a fire rated door. High rise office buildings have enclosed stairways, access stairways (open stairways), and fire towers (smoke proof stairs). At high rise building fires, the first arriving ladder officer should designate which stairway will be the attack stairway and which will be the evacuation stairway. As a matter of necessity, the attack stairway door will have to be opened so the hose line can be advanced from the standpipe outlet on the floor below. This action will contaminate the attack stairway and endanger anyone trying to use that stairway for evacuation.

10 It is important not to stretch a hose line 826 Columbus Ave Bulkhead off a standpipe outlet on the fire floor. Use a standpipe outlet on a floor below. If an outlet is used on the fire floor, the fire may be drawn towards the attack stairway. It heat may be intense enough that it will prevent the operation of the standpipe valve by a firefighter. When stretching a hose line from a standpipe system, use the standpipe outlet on the floor below the fire. If the building is equipped with scissor stairs, there may be only one standpipe outlet on a floor. It may be necessary to hook up to a standpipe outlet on the floor below and move to the other stairway before moving to the fire floor. This action may be necessary to bring the hose line closer to the fire apartment. Fire Towers (aka Smoke Proof Stairs) are ideal for an evacuation stairway. They have an intermediate outside landing before making entry into the stairway. They may have a mechanical 826 Columbus Ave Bulkhead ventilation system in the stairway to remove smoke. Fire Towers are not acceptable for use as an attack stairway. The Fire Tower would draw smoke and heat toward the stairway. There may be Fire Towers that have a standpipe in them. This Fire Tower equipped with a standpipe does not qualify it to be an attack stairway. It would still be a bad choice.

11 If an evacuation stairway is pressurized to keep smoke and heat out of it, keep the stairway doors closed as much as possible. It would only take 2 to 3 stairway doors to be opened to depressurize the stairway. Stacked straight run stairways are usually located in old law tenements. There are no intermediate landings. After climbing to the next floor, you would return to the same starting point on the floor above to climb to the next floor. Each floor would be laid out in a similar fashion. Continuous straight run stairs are found in 826 Columbus Ave., fire origin lofts or factories. The starting point is near the front of the building. There stairway leads to the second floor and a landing on the second floor. Then the stairway continues to the third floor without changing direction (heading toward the rear of the building.) If fire reaches the occupancy entrance door and enters the continuous straight run stairway, it is considered an open interior stair. The continuous straight run stair continues heading toward the rear until it reaches the top floor or the rear of the building. 826 Columbus Ave. soot on hallway walls

12 An inherent danger of the continuous straight run stair is that if the fire is in the area of the stairway inside the occupancy, then the underside of the stairway is being attacked by the fire. This is a danger if the stairway is being used to gain access to the floors above the fire floor. If the continuous straight run stair is made of wood, it may have mortise and tenon joints in its construction which could fail under a sustained fire exposure. A hose stretching problem associated with continuous straight run stairs is that it requires long hose stretches to make it to the top floor. In addition to ascending to the height of the fire, the hose stretch is also heading toward the rear of the building which would require stretching hose for the length of the building. Fire weakened stairways require firefighters to place their feet on the risers of the steps and not the tread. The risers are usually steel or cast iron. The treads may be marble. The marble may fail if exposed to heat. Firefighters should also practice climbing closer to the wall supporting the stairway. The stairway would be stronger at that point rather than climbing in the center of the step or the side away from the support.

13 Thanks to the following people who contributed to this essay: Captain Ray Farrell (Ladder 43), Deputy Assistant Chief Thomas McKavanagh, John Yacavone (Fire Prevention), Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn (Ret.), Janet Kimmerly (WNYF), FM Daniel Maye (Mand Library), Battalion Chief James Yakamovich, Fr. Chris Roberto (Engine 48). Resources: Stairhall Fire Chronology, NY Daily News, Nov. 23, 1995; Stairwell Inferno Kills 2, NY Daily News, Nov. 5, 1995; Investigation Sees Links of Fires in Housing Project Stairways, NY Times, Nov. 9, 1995; Arsonists Take a Toll on New York City, Firehouse Magazine, Jan. 31, 1997; Letterhead Report to Fire Commissioner Howard Safir from Captain Jay Jonas, dated May 20, 1994, Unusual Fire Behavior at 55 East 102 Street ; Stair & Hallway Dangers During Firefighting, by Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn, WNYF 2 nd Issue 1998; LIEUTENANT EDWARD J. McDONAGH, (RET.), ENGINE 37: Passed away on Sunday November 12, 2017 from injuries sustained while operating at Manhattan Box This was the rescue and recovery operation from the attacks at the World Trade Center on September 11, May he rest in peace. Never forget!