New Essays on the History of Autonomy Kantian autonomy is often thought to be independent of time and place, but in his landmark study The Invention of Autonomy has shown that there is much to be learned by setting Kant s moral philosophy in the context of the history of modern moral philosophy. The distinguished authors in this collection continue Schneewind s project by relating Kant s work to the historical context of his predecessors and to the empirical context of human agency. This will be a valuable resource for professional and advanced students in philosophy, the history of ideas, and the history of political thought. Natalie Brender is Policy Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada. Larry Krasnoff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the College of Charleston, South Carolina.
New Essays on the History of Autonomy A Collection Honoring Edited by NATALIE BRENDER Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada LARRY KRASNOFF College of Charleston
University Printing House, Cambridge cb2 8bs, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. Information on this title: /9780521828352 Cambridge University Press 2004 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2004 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data New essays on the history of autonomy : a collection honoring / edited by Natalie Brender, Larry Krasnoff. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. isbn 0-521-82835-x 1. Autonomy (Philosophy) History. i. Brender, Natalie, 1967 ii. Krasnoff, Larry, 1963 iii. Schneewind, J. B. (Jerome B.), 1930 b105.a84n49 2004 170 dc22 2003062974 isbn 978-0-521-82835-2 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents List of Contributors Acknowledgments page vii ix Introduction 1 part one: autonomy in context 1 Justus Lipsius and the Revival of Stoicism in Late Sixteenth-Century Europe 7 John M. Cooper 2 Affective Perfectionism: Community with God without Common Measure 30 Jennifer A. Herdt 3 Autonomy and the Invention of Theodicy 61 Mark Larrimore 4 Protestant Natural Law Theory: A General Interpretation 92 Knud Haakonssen 5 Autonomy in Modern Natural Law 110 Stephen Darwall part two: autonomy in practice 6 Pythagoras Enlightened: Kant on the Effect of Moral Philosophy 133 Larry Krasnoff 7 What Is Disorientation in Thinking? 154 Natalie Brender v
vi Contents 8 Autonomy, Plurality and Public Reason 181 Onora O Neill 9 Trapped between Kant and Dewey: The Current Situation of Moral Philosophy 195 Richard Rorty
Contributors Natalie Brender, Policy Advisor, Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada John M. Cooper, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University Stephen Darwall, John Dewey Collegiate Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan Knud Haakonssen, Professor of Philosophy, Boston University Jennifer A. Herdt, Associate Professor of Theology, University of Notre Dame Larry Krasnoff, Associate Professor of Philosophy, College of Charleston Mark Larrimore, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies and Philosophy, New School University Onora O Neill, Principal, Newnham College, Cambridge University Richard Rorty, Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy, Stanford University vii
Acknowledgments This collection began as a conference honoring the work of J. B. Schneewind, held at Johns Hopkins University in March 2000. We thank Susan Wolf and John Partridge for their assistance in organizing this conference, and all the participants for their contributions to the discussions. We thank Terence Moore at Cambridge University Press for his interest in and support of the project, his assistants Matthew Lord and Stephanie Achard for their assistance during the editorial process, and the two anonymous readers for the Press for their comments. Finally, we thank for all he has given us as a historian of moral philosophy, as a teacher and advisor, and as a friend. ix