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Sensors & Transducers Volume 19, Specal Issue February 2013 www.sensorsportal.com ISSN 1726-5479 Edtors-n-Chef: professor Sergey Y. Yursh, Tel.: +34 696067716, e-mal: edtor@sensorsportal.com Edtors for Western Europe Mejer, Gerard C.M., Delft Unv. of Technology, The Netherlands Ferrar, Vttoro, Unverstá d Bresca, Italy Edtor for Eastern Europe Sachenko, Anatoly, Ternopl Natonal Economc Unversty, Ukrane Edtors for North Amerca Katz, Evgeny, Clarkson Unversty, USA Datskos, Panos G., Oak Rdge Natonal Laboratory, USA Faben, J. Josse, Marquette Unversty, USA Edtor South Amerca Costa-Felx, Rodrgo, Inmetro, Brazl Edtors for Asa Ohyama, Shnj, Tokyo Insttute of Technology, Japan Zhengbng, Hu, Huazhong Unv. of Scence and Technol., Chna Edtor for Asa-Pacfc Mukhopadhyay, Subhas, Massey Unversty, New Zealand Edtor for Afrca Mak K.Habb, Amercan Unversty n Caro, Egypt Edtoral Board Abdul Rahm, Ruzar, Unverst Teknolog, Malaysa Abramchuk, George, Measur. Tech. & Advanced Applcatons, Canada Ascol, Gorgo, George Mason Unversty, USA Atalay, Selcuk, Inonu Unversty, Turkey Atghaee, Ahmad, Unversty of Tehran, Iran Auguts, Vygantas, Kaunas Unversty of Technology, Lthuana Ayesh, Aladdn, De Montfort Unversty, UK Balga, Shankar, B., General Montors, USA Basu, Sukumar, Jadavpur Unversty, Inda Bouvet, Marcel, Unversty of Burgundy, France Campanella, Lug, Unversty La Sapenza, Italy Carvalho, Vtor, Mnho Unversty, Portugal Changha, Ru, Harbn Engneerng Unversty, Chna Chen, We, Hefe Unversty of Technology, Chna Cheng-Ta, Chang, Natonal Cha-Y Unversty, Tawan Chung, Wen-Yaw, Chung Yuan Chrstan Unversty, Tawan Cortes, Camlo A., Unversdad Naconal de Colomba, Colomba D'Amco, Arnaldo, Unverstà d Tor Vergata, Italy De Stefano, Luca, Insttute for Mcroelectroncs and Mcrosystem, Italy Dng, Jannng, Changzhou Unversty, Chna Djordjevch, Alexandar, Cty Unversty of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Donato, Ncola, Unversty of Messna, Italy Dong, Feng, Tanjn Unversty, Chna Erkmen, Aydan M., Mddle East Techncal Unversty, Turkey Gaura, Elena, Coventry Unversty, UK Gole, James, Georga Insttute of Technology, USA Gong, Hao, Natonal Unversty of Sngapore, Sngapore Gonzalez de la Rosa, Juan Jose, Unversty of Cadz, Span Gullet, Bruno, Unversty of Caen, France Hadjloucas, Sllas, The Unversty of Readng, UK Hu, Davd, Unversty of New Orleans, USA Jaffrezc-Renault, Ncole, Claude Bernard Unversty Lyon 1, France Jaml, Mohammad, Qatar Unversty, Qatar Kanusas, Eugenjus, Venna Unversty of Technology, Austra Km, Mn Young, Kyungpook Natonal Unversty, Korea Kumar, Arun, Unversty of Delaware, USA Lay-Ekuaklle, Ame, Unversty of Lecce, Italy Ln, Paul, Cleveland State Unversty, USA Lu, Ahua, Chnese Academy of Scences, Chna Mansor, Muhammad Naufal, Unversty Malaysa Perls, Malaysa Marquez, Alfredo, Centro de Investgacon en Materales Avanzados, Mexco Mshra, Vvekanand, Natonal Insttute of Technology, Inda Moghavvem, Mahmoud, Unversty of Malaya, Malaysa Morello, Rosaro, Unversty "Medterranea" of Reggo Calabra, Italy Mulla, Imtaz Srajuddn, Natonal Chemcal Laboratory, Pune, Inda Nabok, Aleksey, Sheffeld Hallam Unversty, UK Neshkova, Mlka, Bulgaran Academy of Scences, Bulgara Passaro, Vttoro M. N., Poltecnco d Bar, Italy Penza, Mchele, ENEA, Italy Perera, Jose Mguel, Insttuto Poltecnco de Setebal, Portugal Pogacnk, Lea, Unversty of Ljubljana, Slovena Pulln, Danele, Centro Rcerche FIAT, Italy Reg, Candd, Unversty of Valenca, Span Restvo, Mara Teresa, Unversty of Porto, Portugal Rodríguez Martínez, Angel, Unversdad Poltécnca de Cataluña, Span Sadana, Ajt, Unversty of Msssspp, USA Sadeghan Marnan, Hamed, TU Delft, The Netherlands Sapozhnkova, Ksena, D. I. Mendeleyev Insttute for Metrology, Russa Snghal, Subodh Kumar, Natonal Physcal Laboratory, Inda Shah, Kryang, La Trobe Unversty, Australa Sh, Wendan, Calforna Insttute of Technology, USA Shmaly, Yury, Guanajuato Unversty, Mexco Song, Xu, An Yang Normal Unversty, Chna Srvastava, Arvnd K., LghtFeld, Corp, USA Stefanescu, Dan Mha, Romanan Measurement Socety, Romana Sumrddetchkajorn, Sarun, Nat. Electr. & Comp. Tech. Center, Thaland Sun, Zhqang, Central South Unversty, Chna Sysoev, Vctor, Saratov State Techncal Unversty, Russa Thrunavukkarasu, I., Manpal Unversty Karnataka, Inda Vazquez, Carmen, Unversdad Carlos III Madrd, Span Wang, Jangpng, Xan Shyou Unversty, Chna Xue, Nng, Agltron, Inc., USA Yang, Dongfang, Natonal Research Councl, Canada Yang, Shuang-Hua, Loughborough Unversty, UK Yapng Dan, Harvard Unversty, USA Zakara, Zulkarnay, Unversty Malaysa Perls, Malaysa Zhang, Wepng, Shangha Jao Tong Unversty, Chna Zhang, Wenmng, Shangha Jao Tong Unversty, Chna Sensors & Transducers Journal (ISSN 1726-5479) s a peer revew nternatonal journal publshed monthly onlne by Internatonal Frequency Sensor Assocaton (IFSA). Avalable n both: prnt and electronc (prntable pdf) formats. Copyrght 2013 by Internatonal Frequency Sensor Assocaton. All rghts reserved.
Sensors & Transducers Journal Contents Volume 19 Specal Issue February 2013 www.sensorsportal.com ISSN 1726-5479 Research Artcles Study on VSI Swtchng Frequency Optmzaton of PMSM Based Servo System Sh-xong Zhang... 1 Applcaton of an Improved Genetc Algorthm n Network Informaton Flterng Mn Ren, Baoya Song, Jrong Jang... 7 Compresson of Power Qualty Data Based on Improved DCT Transform Hua Ouyang, Hu L, Me Qan... 13 Mechancal Optmzaton Desgn Based on Genetc Algorthm Yng Sun, Yuesheng Gu and Hegen Xong... 19 Camera Pose Estmaton n Dynamc Scenes wth Background Trackng Dong Zhang and Png L... 25 Applcaton of Step Desgn Method to Realze the Synchronzaton of Geneso Chaotc System Yu ZhPeng... 34 Short-term Probablstc Load Forecastng wth the Consderaton of Human Body Amenty Nng Lu... 39 Analyss on Rural Land Crculaton Subject Interests Sh Dong-me, Xu Yue-mng, Wang Jan, Tong Le... 45 A Hgh Precson Mult-functon Electronc Scale Based on PSoC3 Lv Dan-j, Peng Jan-sheng, Zhou Guo-juan, Xu Yong... 51 Studes on Equalzaton Strategy of Battery Management System for Electrc Vehcle Nan Jnru, Guo Meng... 57 Desgn and Optmal Control of Parallel Robot Yng Sun, Yuesheng Gu and Hegen Xong... 64 Pure Surface Texture Mappng Technology and t's Applcaton for Mrror Image We Feng Wang, Hu Feng Yan, QnMao, Mng Lang Zhou... 68 Formng Flaws Analyss of Lead Screw Cold Roll-Beatng Based on Stress-Stran Evoluton He Wangyun, L Yan, Yang Mngshun, Wang Mng... 74 A Reflectve Gratng Mcrocantlever Bosensor Feng Wen, Yuejn Zhao, Xaome Yu, Cheng Gong, Jancheng Yang... 83
An Improved Blnear Interpolaton Algorthm Usng Center Coordnates of Pxels Jng Lu, Mn Xa, We L, and Ke-cheng Yang... 89 Authors are encouraged to submt artcle n MS Word (doc) and Acrobat (pdf) formats by e-mal: edtor@sensorsportal.com Please vst journal s webpage wth preparaton nstructons: http://www.sensorsportal.com/html/digest/submton.htm Internatonal Frequency Sensor Assocaton (IFSA).
Sensors & Transducers, Vol. 19, Specal Issue, February 2013, pp. 45-50 Sensors & Transducers ISSN 1726-5479 2013 by IFSA http://www.sensorsportal.com Analyss on Rural Land Crculaton Subject Interests 1 Sh Dong-Me, 1* Xu Yue-Mng, 2 Wang Jan, Tong Le 1 Collage of Busness, Agrcultural Unversty of Hebe, Baodng 071001, Chna 2 Collage of Admnstraton, Agrcultural Unversty of Hebe, Baodng 071001, Chna E-mal: shdongmede@126.com Receved: 4 December 2012 /Accepted: 15 January 2013 /Publshed: 19 February 2013 Abstract: There are some purpose of ths paper, the one s to mprove the rural land crculaton market, and promote the reasonable transfer of the land norms, the second s reduce bad nfluence of economc and socal stablty development because nfrngement behavor of government departments, the thrd s to reduce some bad nfluence because of asymmetrc nformaton of rural land transfer such as crculaton spontaneous, blndness, arbtrarness and so on. Methods of ths paper used s based on the asymmetrc nformaton game theory, analyses the land crculaton subject nterest gamng relaton, fnd out the process of farmland crculaton of beneft equlbrum. The result s establshed rural land crculaton nterests game model. It s concluded that proposes the measures of strengthen the support and establshment of ncentves for land transfer and promote the development of ntermedary organzatons. Copyrght 2013 IFSA. Keywords: Transfer of agrcultural land, Subjects of crculaton, transfer Income, Interests of the game. 1. Introducton Land s not only the basc elements of agrcultural producton, but also the basc guarantee for farmer survval, as a result of farmland comparatve ncome s too low, agrcultural producton and ncome are dffcult to satsfy farmers growng materal and cultural needs. Large amount of the agrcultural labor force shft to town engaged n non-agrcultural ndustres, rural land crculaton phenomenon ncreases ncreasngly. By the frst half of 2011, the rght to the contracted management of land crculaton area of 207 mllon mu, has accounted for 16.2 % [1] of the total cultvated land contractng. The scale of the farmland crculaton n land to realze scale management, but also n the crculaton between subject produced many dsputes and contradctons, the rural harmonous, food safety, as well as the nfluence produced. Scholars have the rght to the contracted management of land crculaton research most focus on llegal land use, the farmers' nterests are volated [3], and n the process of land expropraton rent-seekng and supervson angle, thnk that the property rghts are not clear farmland crculaton s the man reason for the dspute [4]. But for the subject of farmland crculaton flow nformaton and crculaton of the nterest relatonshp research less. In ths paper, accordng to the dfferent mode of farmland crculaton, ths paper analyzes the subject of farmland crculaton beneft gamblng relatonshp, and fnd out the nterests balance, reasonable and effcent for the farmland crculaton proposed solutons. 45
Sensors & Transducers, Vol. 19, Specal Issue, February 2013, pp. 45-50 2. The Connotaton of Rural Land Crculaton Our country rural land crculaton s based on farmland famly contracted management system. Complete farmland property rghts should nclude the land ownershp, use, usufruct, dsposton and by these rghts segmentaton and combnaton of the bundle of rghts [5], but n Chna the rght to the contracted management of rural land s to pont to the land use rght, that s, n a certan perod utlze, seek profts from and dspose of the lmted rghts. Our country on March 1, 2005 the "rural land contractng rght of management crculaton way" regulaton land crculaton must adhere to farmers on the prncple of voluntary partcpaton, the crculaton way as the land swap, lease, become a shareholder, subcontract, cooperaton, etc., and through the land admnstraton departments for the record, sgn contract crculaton. "Method" provsons of the rght to the contracted management of rural land crculaton of the contracted land may not be altered the agrcultural use [6], flow perod shall not be more than the remnant term of the orgnal contract, and shall not harm nterests and the rural collectve economc organzaton's legtmate rghts and nterests. The result of the rural land crculaton s refers to the rural famly contract land through the legal form, the rght to transfer to other farmers or other economc organzaton behavor. 3. Game Model Establshment and Beneft Equlbrum Analyss 3.1. The Hypothess Condtons of Game Model Establshment In the land crculaton process, partcpants manly nclude the followng four aspects, such as land transferor, transferee land, ntermedary organzatons and government. So we made the artcle s research hypothess as follows. In the frst, land transferor and transferee are ratonal economc man; each partcpant wll conduct the analyss of costs and benefts. The second s whch land transferor, the transferee, ntermedary organzatons and governments are able to consttute a separate entty, and the nternal contradctons have been cleared. [7] The thrd s each partcpant s non-cooperaton, partcpaton man body don't know each other's strategy n advance; the game process nformaton s ncomplete, that player can't fully grasp each other's characterstcs, strateges and utlty functon stuaton; the game s a dynamc, the actors can know he strategy after the frst choce of t actors. 3.2. Game Model Parameter Settngs Ths study set partcpants number of model s (=1,2,3,4), v s assessment prce of wll crculate prvate land, only I partcpant knows hs v, and mutual ndependence, v s stochastc varable, v v, v, v v respectvely show the lowest and hghest value of the crculate land. The dstrbuton functon F (v) s the common knowledge. The type of the operatng costs of the crculate land s θ, θ H. The probablty of government to ntervene agrcultural land transfer s P(θ ), P(θ )[0, 1], and not practced nterventon probablty s 1-P(θ ). Let probablty of land nflow have hgh ncome or low cost s μ, and have hgh-cost s 1-μ. The payoff functon s R, utlty functon s E (R ). H s strategc space of each partcpant. The strategy space of land transferor s H 1 = {transfer out land, not Transfer out land}. The land transferee strategy collecton s H 2 ={transferred nto land, not transferred nto land}. Strategy space of ntermedary organzatons s H 3 ={set up, not set up}. Strategy space of government s H 4 ={ntervene land transfer, not to ntervene land transfer}. The artcle made the game order as follows. It supposed there are two perods, and the government s natural person n the process of farmland crculaton (supposed t). In the t=1 perod, The nflow sde of the agrcultural land made sgnal of contract land, frst acton by the government and decde whether ntervene agrcultural land transfer, transferee and transferor accordng to government acton to determne the probablty of government nterventon and determnes whether crculate land. In the perod of t=2, accordng to the act of land nflow part, the land outflow sde judgment land transfer costs, ntentons and land use after turnover. And then accordng to ther revenue functon determne whether to flow, n order to acheve the expected utlty maxmzaton. 3.3. Cost and Beneft Analyss of Game Partcpants 3.3.1. Cost and Beneft Analyss of Land Transferor In the process of land transfer, farmers who want to turn out land owned land contract and management rghts are land contractng. Hs total revenue of turn out land ncludes expected return of farmland rent and expected yearly return of labor force transfer. Supposed that dscount rate s r, land usage tme to turn out s, =1 n, so the total revenue of turn out land s: Y Y n Z L 1 C P1 1 1 r Y, (1) where Y 1 s the beneft of land outflow, Y 0 s the rental of land outflow, Y L s the expected revenue of transfer the labor force, C p1 s the compensaton of land nflow gve to land outflow, r s the dscount rate, I s the lmt age of land-use rght, = 1 n, Y Z =P 1 Q 1, P s the prce 46
Sensors & Transducers, Vol. 19, Specal Issue, February 2013, pp. 45-50 of Land crculaton, Q s the area, Y L =wt, w s the work wage, t s work tme. Suppose that C 1 s crculaton cost of land turn out, t nclude transacton expenses of negotate about farmer and busness ncome of cultvate famng land. So the cost C 1 s: n Y P1 C 1 C 0 1 r 1 (2) Throw land crculaton, net ncome (R 1 ) of land outflow sde s: Y Y n n 1 R 1 Y 1 - C 1 1 1 Z L P C P - C 1 0 1 r 1 r (3) Assume that the probablty of land roll out s μ, the expected return E(R 1 ) of land roll out sde s: E( R 1 ) u( R1 ) ( 1 - u ) Y P 1 (4) 3.3.2. Cost and Beneft Analyss of Land Transferee The beneft of land transferee s approprate scale of operaton land beneft, ts value decded by the sze of the agrcultural producton and prce. The prce of agrcultural products s v, ts value decded by market. The agrcultural yeld valued by C-D producton functon f(l, N, K, T), L s land, N s labor force, K s captal, T s technology, the busness ncome Y 2 of after land crculaton s: Y 2 n 1 v f ( L, N, K (1 r ), T ) Y (5) The cost of land transferee nclude four part, on the one hand s producton costs n the land management process, such as labor cost, pestcdes and fertlzers cost C (N, K, T). The second s land lease costs whch pad to farmers, ths cost s Y Z, t s also named rent of land crculaton. The thrd s A d, t s cost of agrcultural natural product and market operator s rsk, whch must undertake for agrcultural producton. Fourth, the transacton costs of agrcultural land takes s C j, then transferred cost C 2 s: C 2 n 1 C ( N, K, L ) Y (1 r ) Z A d C j (6) Through land crculaton, net ncome (R 2 ) of demand sde of agrculture s: v f( L, N, K, T)-C( N, K, L)-Y n Z 2 Y2 -C2 - Ad -Cj (7) 1 (1 r) R If probablty of agrcultural land transfer s u, the expected return E (R 2 ) of land nflow s: E( R 2) u R 2 (1 - u ) 0 (8) 3.4. Game Analyss of Agrcultural Land Transfer 3.4.1. The Smple Transfer between Farmers In the asymmetrc nformaton dynamc game P ( ) 0 process of land transfer, when t means the farmers expected pror probablty of government regulatory s zero. In ths case, the land transfer behavor just flows nto and out of the land transfer. Accordng to the land transfer revenue analyss, transferor occuped land revenue s Y p1, the beneft of outflow land s R 1 ; the beneft of use land by land nflow s R 2, the transferee pad compensaton to transferor s C P1, the cost of negotate to nflow sde s C P2, specfc nterest analyss Table 1. Table 1. The man body nterest game matrx of transfer n and transfer out. Inflow sde Inflow sde Outflow Not outflow Lessee R 2, R 1 - C P2, Y 2 Not lessee - C P2, Y P1 - C P2, Y P1 In the game of land crculaton between farmer to famer, outflow party usually have a non-agrcultural busness ncome, land prvate ncome generally not as the manstay of famles' ncome, the payoff functon for labor transfer wages (w) functon, utlty s U (w), the maxmum utlty argmax U (w) s a wage functon, whether the land crculaton, the crculaton prce value decded by cost sze of land nflow sde, also s the sze of the benefts. In the tradtonal agrcultural management, the farmer's land ncome (Y p1 ) s very low, whether or not the land crculaton, need consderng whether to roll out ncome R 1 > Y p1 namely R 1 - Y p1 > 0, when farmer beleve they wll acheve hgher yeld of land roll out, the land would turn out. In economcally developed areas, agrcultural ncome not as the manstay of famles' ncome, farmers wll land roll out can obtan rental ncome and reduce the nvestment of labor force and land management costs, they can use all the energy n other ndustres, ths part of the farmers wllng to roll out the land. Obvously, n the game matrx, no matter what the outflow party strategy, leased s always flows nto the sde of the optmal strategy, ther earnngs for R 2. Therefore, the game equlbrum soluton s (leased, roll out). 47
Sensors & Transducers, Vol. 19, Specal Issue, February 2013, pp. 45-50 3.4.2. The Land Crculaton Game Analyss of Government Partcpate Land crculaton s generally dvded nto two cases by government nterventon. The frst one s collectve cultvate whch s not change the land use. Another case s change of land use whch use land for constructon. In ths condton, the farmers expected pror probablty of government regulaton greater P ( ) 0 than zero, t s. 3.4.2.1. Land Collectve Cultvate whch s not Change the Land use For the land outflow party, set farmers ncome of roll-out sde s Y p1, transferred out revenue s R 1. For the land nflow party, the negotatng cost of transferee s C S2, crculaton revenue s R 2, and government nterventon game matrx s Table 2: Inflow party Table 2. The nterest game matrx of not change land use. Crculaton Not crculaton Outflow party Hgh cost Low cost Not Crculaton crculaton Crculaton R 2, R 1 - C S2, Y P1 - C S2, Y P1 - C S2, Y P1 R 2, R 1 - C S2, Y P1 Not crculaton - C S2, Y P1 - C S2, Y P1 In the condton of collectve transfer, there are multple outflow transferor negotate wth the government or land nflow sde, ths transferor stuaton s more complcated, there are consderable part of the farmers made land revenue as ther major famly revenue, [8] the land have basc socal securty functon, so the land nflow sde need pay much hgher cost for land transfer. The outflow sde needs to determne probablty value of the nflow sde of land operatng costs, and then determne the use of after land transfer, land transfer rsk ncreased. As nflow sde, f used transfer land for low-ncome agrcultural crop, the operate ncome of after transfer land s lower to nsuffcent compensate for land transfer cost, such as negotable prce, the government's rent-seekng costs, and so on. Ths condton can not makng the crculaton be completed. So, the transferee usually hgh-yeld busness, [9] whch would take place land use change and land non-agrcultural. In the process of the transfer of nformaton asymmetry and other reasons, farmers cannot master the nflow sde busness nformaton, whch often occur reverse selecton and moral hazard problems, resultng n land transfer dsputes. Ths stuaton drect threat to natonal food securty, and shall not change the requrements of the land use contrary to the land transfer. 3.4.2.2. The Crculaton of Changed Agrculture Land use When t comes to change land agrcultural use, usually t s government acton. Accordng to chna's relevant laws and regulatons, the farmers collectve land property rght cannot be traded, [10] can legally be lease wthn a certan perod of tme or assgnment of the rght to use. So, n process of land crculaton, the government have mportant role. The government s that polcy makers and mplementers, therefore, the government conduct s trpartte external condtons to game. Set the natonal land acquston compensaton of the transferor s CG1, the land transferee requred to pay the cost of leased from the state s CG2, the cost of transferee want to get land negotatons to government s CG3, takng nto account the use of natonal expropraton land, and then transfer to the transferee, the game matrx s shown n Table 3: Table 3. The nterest game matrx changed land use. Inflow sde Drectly leased Collectve leased Outflow sde Spontaneous outflow R 2, R 1 R 2 -C G1 - C G3, R 1 Collectve outflow R 2, C G1 + R 3 R 2 -C G1 - C G3, C G1 + R 3 Not crculaton - C P2, Y 2 - C G3, Y 2 Not leased 0, Y 2 0, Y 2 0, Y 2 Because the government can acheve certan fnancal ncome through the land transfer access, the artcle assumes that n the crcumstances the government requston of land by the state, transferor and transferee game model can be dvded nto two modes; t s natonal requston and spontaneous crculaton. Table4. The nterest game matrx of change land use. Inflow sde Outflow sde Spontaneous outflow Drectly leased Collectve leased Collectve outflow R 2, R 1 R 2, C G1 + R 3 R 2 -C G1 - C G3, R 1 R 2 -C G1 - C G3, C G1 + R 3 Through the above game matrx, t can be found that the transferor and the transferee s choce spontaneous roll out or through the natonal land expropraton, depends on both sdes of the ncome 48
Sensors & Transducers, Vol. 19, Specal Issue, February 2013, pp. 45-50 stuaton. When the governments pay more compensate than the transferee, roll out party wll choose to let the state exproprated land, and when the transferee fnd drectly lease land can acheve more ncome than from the government requston land, they may choose to drect leased. At ths tme, they also need to consder the governments take restrctons for spontaneous land crculaton, [11] how much strength factors. When the government exercses ts land monopoly power, and prohbted from spontaneous crculaton, they may exercse certan power of land spontaneous crculaton, when R 2 - F < R 2 - C G1 - C G3, and the transferee needs to nflow land, due to the cost ncome consderaton, t had to choose through the country to obtan the land use rght. The balanced result of game s (the state exproprated, the state exproprated). 3.4.3. The Land Crculaton Game Analyss of Intermedary Organzaton Partcpate Farmland crculaton servce center usually have the government management, the center of nformaton are through the government revew, nformaton more relable, reduce the crculaton of the partcpant's nformaton cost. On the one hand, they can look up some nformaton through ntermedary organzaton such as farmland use, the mode of operaton, content, and other nformaton, and then determne whether to precede land crculaton, reduce the cost of negotatons and collecton nformaton, etc. On the other hand, the transferee not only can understand the transferor's land stuaton, but also can judge whether the wllng to transfer land concentraton and lamnated plate, reduce the cost of negotatons use of a large amount of manpower and materal resources. Through the land crculaton ntermedary organzatons, reduce the cost of access to nformaton and negotaton, ncreases the crculaton of both sdes of the utlty, and at the same tme, ntermedary also won the servce ncome. The equlbrum of the game s (establsh ntermedary organzaton, contract land, contract land). 4. Analyss of Game Model Equlbrum Result 4.1. To Promote the Development of Intermedary Organzatons Rural land crculaton market s not perfect; flow nformaton asymmetry s the major problems n the current land crculaton. To mprove the crculaton of rural land market and promote rural land crculaton reasonable defaults and reduce the occurrence of the dspute, and set up tradng places, regularly ssue land market nformaton, can ncrease the land tradng transparency, reduce transacton cost, make land market tradng rules, s clear about the transacton procedures, regulate trade behavor, coordnate the allocaton of land resources relatons; Set up ncludng consultng, agency, arbtraton, land prce assessment nsttutons and ther related system, for the determnaton of farmland converson prce provde reasonable bass. Relyng on the rural grass-roots management department to establsh crculaton servce organzaton, for flow provde relevant legal polcy propaganda, crculaton of nformaton, flow consultng, prce assessment, contract sgnng gudance, [12] the nterest relatonshp coordnaton, dspute medaton and other servces, and gradually establsh and mprove crculaton servce platform and network, and constantly mprove the crculaton mechansm. 4.2. Strengthen the Support and Establshment of Incentves for Land Transfer Every year fnancal budget should arrange certan land transfer specal funds for support of rural land cultvaton whch s legal, orderly and have certan sze. The specal funds also encourage and gude the rural land contract management rghts. All of ths s not only to focus on contguous flow and promote an approprate scale of land but also to ncrease the farmers' ncome. For example, f the land transfer has stable relatonshp and transfer tme lmt over 5 years and newly sngle cases of land transfer area exceed 66.67 hmz more (land area 20 hm stock cooperatve shares or more) they wll share the polcy, accordng to a certan standard, townshp government and admnstratve vllages wll gve hm one-tme award. For the use of hgh-scale cultvaton of the land transfer of farmng communtes and farmng cooperatves, each should be gven to certan ncentves; of leadng agrcultural enterprses to set up producton base, seeds and seedlngs of agrcultural demonstraton zones and base led farmers to beneft sgnfcantly n sze busness reaches a certan level, should be gven some reward; postve resource for farmers to transfer land, and the transfer of land to the approprate scale, to gve some ncentves and subsdes. 5. Conclusons Ths paper analyss of farmland crculaton nterests of the man body and establshed game model of the land crculaton between dfferent subjects and llustrates the dfferent man bodes who partcpate n the game relaton. Puts forward some suggestons on land transfer, such as to promote the development of ntermedary organzatons and strengthen the support and establshment of ncentves for land transfer and so on. But n rural country, the farmer s nformaton meda s lmted, they needs all knds of help, such as 49
Sensors & Transducers, Vol. 19, Specal Issue, February 2013, pp. 45-50 establsh the land bank, ncrease fnancal support and so on. In order to reduce the nformaton asymmetry of agrculture land transfer cost and moral rsk dsputes, make the rural land contracted management rght s really play an mportant role. Acknowledgements The work presented n ths paper was supported by Natonal Socal Scence project under grant No.12BJY089; Mnstry of Educaton humanstc and socal scence project under grant No. 12YJAZH138; The Federaton of Socal Scences of Hebe project under grant No. 201203289; Human resources and socal securty offce of Hebe under grant No. JRS-2012-1063. References [1]. Xu Yuemng. Research on nnovatve of land contractual management an household system. Chna's Agrculture Press, Be Jng, 2007, pp. 12-56. [2]. Wang Jan, Agrcultural producton and operaton producton management theory and method, Chna's Educaton Culture Press, Chna, 2005, pp. 5-41. [3]. Sh Dongme, Lang Shan, Hu Jan, The Analyss of the prncpal--agent relatonshp n rural land crculaton markets, n Proceedngs of the Internatonal Conference on Computer and Management (CAMAN' 2012), Wuhan, Chna, March 9-11, 2012, pp. 445-448. [4]. Rochet J, Trole J., Two-sded Markets: A Progress Report, Mmeo, IDEI Unversty of Toulouse, 2005, pp. 367-375. [5]. Theodore W. Schultz, Transformng Tradtonal Agrculture, Yale Unversty Press, New Haven, 1964, 47-89. [6]. Elnor Ostrom, Governng the Commons, The Evoluton of Insttutons for Collectve Acton, Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1990, pp. 11-30. [7]. D Gale Johnson, Chna's Rural and Agrcultural Reforms: Successes and Falures, Chnese Economes Research Centre (CERC) Workng Papers, 1996, 12, pp. 34-78. [8]. Ells Frank, Peasant Economcs, Cambrdge Unversty Press, 2006, pp. 67-98. [9]. Lu Zhong, L Baoguo, Spatal dstrbuton of Chna gran output based on land use and populaton densty, Transactons of the Chnese Socety of Agrcultural Engneerng (Transactons of the CSAE), 28, 9, 2012, pp. 1-8. (n Chnese wth Englsh abstract) [10]. Gao Langlang, Huang Jkun, An Analyss of the Relatonshp between Crculaton Farmland of Dfferent Types and Farmers' Investment, Chnese Rural Economy, 2011, 4, pp. 9-17 (n Chnese wth Englsh abstract). [11]. Tang Xume, Chen Bamng, Zhang Lena and Gu Xaokun, Analyss of cultvated land consoldaton potental n Chna, Transactons of the Chnese Socety of Agrcultural Engneerng, 28, 1, 2012, pp. 219-224 [12]. Qu Futan, Research on relatonshp between the Land prces and the dstrbuton system and the non-agrculturalzaton of farmland economc mechansm, Chnese Rural Economy, 12, 2001, pp. 54-60 (n Chnese wth Englsh abstract). [13]. Ralegh Barlowe, Gu Shuzhong (translate), Land Resource Economcs, Agrcultural unversty press of Bejng, Be Jng, 1989, pp. 12-77 (n Chnese wth Englsh abstract). 2013 Copyrght, Internatonal Frequency Sensor Assocaton (IFSA). All rghts reserved. (http://www.sensorsportal.com) 50
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