E-Filed Document May 12 2017 11:15:07 2016-CA-01448 Pages: 22 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI CASE NO. 2016-CA-01448 BROWN LAKELAND PROPERTIES and CHARLES H. BROWN Appellants v. RENASANT BANK Appellee BRIEF OF APPELLANTS BROWN LAKELAND PROPERTIES ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI Submitted by Counsel for the Appellants, Brown Lakeland Properties and Charles H. Brown: Pamela L. Hancock (MSB# 10676) Jeffrey B. McGuire (MSB# 104622) HANCOCK LAW FIRM, PLLC Post Office Box 1078 Ridgeland, Mississippi 39158 Telephone: (601) 853-2223 Facsimile: (601) 853-9693 Email: pamela@hancocklawgroup.com i
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI CASE NO. 2016-CA-01448 BROWN LAKELAND PROPERTIES and CHARLES H. BROWN Appellants v. RENASANT BANK Appellee CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS The undersigned counsel of record for Appellants, Brown Lakeland Properties and Charles H. Brown, certifies that the following listed persons have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the justices of the Supreme Court and/or judges of the Court of Appeals may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal. 1. Charles H. Brown Member, Brown Lakeland Properties, LLC (Appellant) 2. Pamela L. Hancock, Esq. HANCOCK LAW FIRM, PLLC Attorney for Appellants 3. Jeffrey B. McGuire, Esq. HANCOCK LAW FIRM, PLLC Attorney for Appellants 4. Teri D. Gleason, Esq. JEFFERY P. REYNOLDS, PA Prior Counsel for Appellants ii
5. Connie S. Jelliffe, Esq. NIPPES, HEALEY, & GAULT Prior Counsel for Appellants 6. Glenn S. Swartzfager, Esq. HAZZARD LAW LLC Prior Counsel for Appellants 7. Scott Williams RENASANT BANK Vice President and Special Assets Officer 8. Scott R. Hendrix, Esq. MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS, P.A. Attorney for Appellee 9. R. Brannon Kahlstorf, Esq. MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS, P.A. Attorney for Appellee 10. Honorable Steve S. Ratcliff, III Circuit Court Judge, 20 th Judicial District SO CERTIFIED, this the 12 th day of May, 2017. BY: /s/ Pamela L. Hancock Pamela L. Hancock (MSB# 10676) Attorney for Appellants iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS...ii TABLE OF CONTENTS...iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...v STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT...vii I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES...1 II. III. STATEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT...2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE...3 A. Statement of the Proceedings...3 B. Statement of the Facts...4 IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT...5 V. ARGUMENT...6 A. Standard of Review...6 B. The Appellee was not entitled to summary judgment...7 I. Renasant failed to establish that a demand for the alleged post-foreclosure deficiencies was ever made...7 ii. Renasant failed to establish that its bids represented the fair market values of the properties...8 iii. The appraisals on the properties were deficient...11 VI. CONCLUSION...14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...15 iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Allied Steel v. Cooper, 607 So.2d 118 (Miss. 1992)...9, 12, 13 Buckel v. Chaney, 47 So.3d 148 (Miss. 2010)...7 Central Financial Services, Inc. v. Spears, 425 So.2d 403 (Miss. 1983)...9 Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595 (Miss. 1993)...7 Eller Media Co. v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 882 So.2d 198 (Miss. 2004)...6, 11, 12 Gulf South Pipeline Company, LP v. Pitre, 35 So.3d 494 (Miss. 2010)...11 Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 153 So.3d 703 (Miss. 2014)...5, 7, 8 Hartman v. McInnis, 996 So.2d 704 (Miss. 2007)...6, 8 Karpinsky v. American National Instance Co., 109 So.3d 84 (Miss. 2013)...7 Lake Hillside Estates, Inc. v. Galloway, 473 So.2d 461 (Miss. 1985)...6 Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Franklin County Timber Co., 488 So.2d 782 (Miss. 1986)...11 Mississippi Valley Title Insurance Co. v. Home Construction Co., Inc., 372 So.2d 1270 (Miss. 1979)...6, 8 Myles v. Cox, 217 So.2d 31 (Miss. 1968)...9 Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511 (Miss. 1990)...9 Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346 (Miss. 1990)...7 Rebelwood, Ltd. v. Hinds County, 544 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1989)...11 Wansley v. First National Bank of Vicksburg, 566 So.2d 1218 (Miss. 1990)...9 Weyburn v. Watkins, 90 Miss. 728, 44 So. 145 (1907)...9 v
Rules Miss. R. Civ. P. 56...6 Publications Black s Law Dictionary 414 (6 th ed. 1991)...8, 10 vi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Oral argument is not requested before the Court in this case. This case does not involve complex legal issues or intensive factual analysis of the record. Therefore, undersigned counsel does not believe that oral argument would aid the Court in the disposition of this case. BY: /s/ Pamela L. Hancock Pamela L. Hancock (MSB# 10676) Attorney for Appellants vii
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES I. Renasant failed to establish that a demand for the alleged post-foreclosure deficiencies was ever made. ii. Renasant failed to establish that its bids represented the fair market values of the properties. iii. The appraisals on the properties were deficient. 1
STATEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT The Appellants assert that this case is not required to be retained by the Mississippi Supreme Court under Rule 16(b) or (d) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Statement of the Proceedings On or about July 10, 2015, the Appellee, Renasant Bank, filed a Complaint against the Appellants, Brown Lakeland Properties, LLC and Charles H. Brown, for collection of an alleged deficiency on certain notes. (C.P. 4-23). The Court sua sponte issued an Order regarding motion hearings and briefings on or about July 10, 2015. (C.P. 25-27). On or about September 14, 2015, the Appellants answered the Complaint and filed a Counterclaim alleging an inadequate sales price and various acts of negligence. (C.P. 36-44). The Appellee answered the Counterclaim on or about October 14, 2015. (C.P. 45-52). An Order was entered assigning the case to the Honorable Steve S. Ratcliff on or about December 28, 2015. (C.P. 53). On or about May 3, 2016, the Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with an accompanying brief on the same day. (C.P. 54-273). The Appellants responded to the Appellee s Motion for Summary Judgment on or about May 26, 2016, and additionally filed a supplemental response on or about June 9, 2016. (C.P. 274-321). The Appellee filed a rebuttal to the Appellant s response on or about June 20, 2016. (C.P. 324-337). A hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was noticed for August 22, 2016, and upon conclusion of said hearing, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. (C.P. 322-323). The final judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellee in the total amount of One Million Four Hundred Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Eighty- Six Cents ($1,416,722.86) was entered on or about September 9, 2016. (C.P. 338-339). The Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on October 7, 2016, and thereafter complied with all other requirements necessary to perfect the instant appeal. (C.P. 340-345). 3
B. Statement of the Facts The Appellants are the former owners of three parcels of land in Yazoo County, Mississippi and Rankin County, Mississippi, which were the subject of the litigation in the lower court. Said parcels were secured by two certain promissory notes with the Appellee, both having been executed on November 29, 2012, and having had original face values of Two Million Eight Hundred Eighty Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Dollars and Eighty-Seven Cents ($2,880,320.87) and Nine Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Six Dollars and Forty Cents ($906,786.40), respectively. The Appellants defaulted on both notes, and all three parcels were then purchased by the Appellee at public foreclosure sales held on December 29, 2014. The parcels secured under the larger note were a 635 acre tract of raw land on Carson Road in Yazoo County, Mississippi and 1145 Old Fannin Road in Brandon, Mississippi, on which a bowling alley sits. The smaller note was secured by 6.75 acres of land located on Old Fannin Road in Brandon, Mississippi. The Appellee obtained appraisals for all three parcels in anticipation of the foreclosure sales. (C.P. 68-260). The appraisal reported that the bowling alley parcel had a market value of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000.00) and a disposition value (foreclosure or liquidation value) of Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($900,000.00); that the 6.75 acres had a market value of One Million Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($1,475,000.00) and a disposition value of Eight Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Dollars ($885,000.00); and that the 635 acres had a market value of One Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars ($1,240,000.00) and a disposition value of Nine Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($930,000.00). (C.P. 68-260). At the foreclosure sale, the Appellee purchased the Rankin County properties for Seven 4
Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($780,000.00) and Seven Hundred Seventy-Eighty Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($778,100.00), respectively. At a separate foreclosure sale, the Appellee purchased the Yazoo County property for Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($900,000.00). All three parcels were subsequently sold to third parties. The Appellants had a purchase and sale agreement dated November 13, 2014, whereby approximately an acre of the vacant Rankin County property was to be sold to Veracity, LLC for Ten Dollars ($10.00) per square foot, or approximately Four Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($435,600.00) per acre. (C.P. 285-291). Veracity, LLC later requested to purchase a larger portion of the parcel, approximately 60,500 square feet, for a total purchase price of Six Hundred Five Thousand Dollars ($605,000.00). (C.P. 312-321). The Appellee refused to allow said sale to go through, but did later sell the entire contiguous parcel to the same buyer. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the Appellee due to the fact that genuine issues of material and triable facts existed, specifically regarding the sale of the foreclosedupon properties. The purchase price for all three parcels was not only not commercially reasonable, it was not even equal to the foreclosure value provided by the Appellee s own appraisal reports. Nothing contained in the record evidences that a demand for the post-foreclosure deficiencies was ever made by the Appellee, as is required by law. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 153 So.3d 703 (Miss. 2014). Mississippi law requires a mortgagee to do so before it can collect a post-foreclosure deficiency. Id. Further, as mentioned above, not only were the purchase prices of the parcels not commercially reasonable, the appraisals on the property were deficient in that the methodology used 5
caused the resulting values to be flawed. The Appellee must establish that its bid at the foreclosure sales represented the fair market value of the property. Hartman v. McInnis, 996 So.2d 704 (Miss. 2007). Certainly, when appraising an owner s interest in commercial property, all three methods of valuation could be relevant and useful and, at a minimum, should be considered. Eller Media Co. v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 882 So.2d 198 (Miss. 2004). Moreover, the trial court wholly failed to consider the fact that the Appellants had secured a buyer for a portion of the vacant property, a material fact that not only should have been submitted to the trier of fact, but one that additionally would have substantially mitigated the alleged deficiency. The mortgagee s right to a deficiency decree is not absolute. Mississippi Valley Title Insurance Co. v. Home Construction Co., Inc., 372 So.2d 1270 (Miss. 1979). While it has been held that the power to render a deficiency decree is governed by the rules which would apply to law, it has also been held that the court has jurisdiction after a foreclosure sale to determine any intervening fact which would make it inequitable to enter a deficiency decree. Lake Hillside Estates, Inc. v. Galloway, 473 So.2d 461 (Miss. 1985). ARGUMENT A. Standard of Review The familiar standard for summary judgment at the trial court level is found in Miss. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. When reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, the appellate court applies a de novo standard of review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 6
motion has been made. Karpinsky v. American National Insurance Co., 109 So.3d 84 (Miss. 2013). This Court has explained in a summary judgment hearing, [the] burden of producing evidence in support of, or in opposition to, [the] motion... is a function of [Mississippi] rules regarding the burden of proof at trial on the issues in question. Karpinsky citing Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346 (Miss. 1990). The movant bears the burden of persuading the trial judge that: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, and (2) on the basis of the facts established, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The movant bears the burden of production if, at trial, he would [bear] the burden of proof on th[e] issue raised. Id. In other words, the movant only bears the burden of production where they would bear the burden of proof at trial. Karpinsky citing Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595 (Miss. 1993). Furthermore, summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Karpinsky citing Buckel v. Chaney, 47 So.3d 148 (Miss. 2010). B. The Appellee was not entitled to summary judgment. I. Renasant failed to establish that a demand for the alleged postforeclosure deficiencies was ever made. The Appellee has failed to show as a matter of record that any demand for the postforeclosure deficiencies was ever made. The record does not contain evidence that demand has ever been made for the deficiency on the second mortgage, which is required under Mississippi law before a mortgagee can collect a post-foreclosure deficiency. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 153 So.3d 703 (Miss. 2014) (citing Lakeland 7
Hillsdale Estates, Inc. v. Galloway, 473 So.2d 461 (Miss. 1985) and Mississippi Valley Title Insurance Co. v. Horne Construction Co., Inc., 372 So.2d 1270 (Miss. 1979)). Like in Gutierrez, there is no showing in the record here that the Appellee ever made a demand on the Appellants for the post-foreclosure deficiency, as is required by law. This fact alone should have precluded the Appellee from obtaining a grant of summary judgment. As such, the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the Appellee when it failed to consider the lack of any demand for post-foreclosure deficiency in the record, as is the requirement, pursuant to Mississippi law. ii. Renasant failed to establish that its bids represented the fair market values of the properties. Perhaps most critical to the analysis of this matter on appeal is the issue of the purchase prices at the foreclosure sales for the various parcels by the Appellee. Simply stated, the Appellee paid less than its own appraised foreclosure value on all three parcels, and in at least one instance, grossly less than what would have constituted actual fair market value, not based on a hypothetical appraisal, but on what an actual bona fide purchaser had agreed to pay. The Appellee must establish that its bids at the foreclosure sale[s] represented the fair market value of the property. Hartman v. McInnis, 996 So.2d 704 (Miss. 2007). Fair market value is defined as [t]he amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. Black s Law Dictionary 414 (6 th ed. 1991). The determination of fair market value is a question for the trier of fact, and this Court will respect the trial court s findings of fact when they are supported by reasonable evidence in the record and are not manifestly 8
wrong. Allied Steel v. Cooper, 607 So.2d 118 (Miss. 1992) (citing Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511 (Miss. 1990) and Myles v. Cox, 217 So.2d 31 (Miss. 1968)). Absent any irregularity in the conduct of a foreclosure sale, it may not be set aside unless the sales price is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the Court or to amount to fraud. Allied Steel at 118 (quoting Wansley v. First National Bank of Vicksburg, 566 So.2d 1218 (Miss. 1990). To determine what may shock the conscience, the Court has explained that the bid price must be so inadequate that it would be impossible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it. Central Financial Services, Inc. v. Spears, 425 So.2d 403 (Miss. 1983). The threshold of inadequacy, or what it takes to shock the conscience of the court, has been a somewhat imprecise standard. [The Mississippi Supreme Court has] long followed the rule of thumb of about forty percent of fair market value first articulated in Weyburn v. Watkins, 90 Miss. 728, 44 So. 145 (1907). Allied Steel at 120. By example, a bid price of thirty-six percent (36%) of fair market value at a foreclosure sale has been found to be inadequate. Id. Here, the three parcels were all undisputedly purchased for less than foreclosure value, according to the Appellee s appraisal report. The bowling alley parcel in Rankin County, which sold to the Appellee for Seven Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($780,000.00), had a fair market value of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000.00) and a disposition value of Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($900,000.00), this according to the Appellee s appraisal report. The vacant parcel in Rankin County, which sold to the Appellee for Seven Hundred Seventy-Eight Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($778,100.00), had a fair market value of One Million Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($1,475,000.00) and a disposition value of Eight Hundred Eighty- Five Thousand Dollars ($885,00.00), this according to the Appellee s appraisal report. The land in 9
Yazoo County, which sold to the Appellee for Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($900,000.00), had a fair market value of One Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars ($1,240,000.00) and a disposition value of Nine Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($930,000.00), this according to the Appellee s appraisal report. (C.P. 68-260). At first glance, according to the shocks the conscience standard of forty percent (40%) of fair market value, it may appear that all three purchases were reasonable. However, it must be considered that the Appellants had a bona fide purchase agreement prior to the foreclosure sales for over an acre of the vacant lot at Ten Dollars ($10.00) per square foot or approximately Four Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($435,600.00) per acre. (C.P. 285-291). That purchaser was Veracity, LLC. Using the willing buyer and willing seller language from Black s Law Dictionary referenced above, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the purchase price agreed upon in the November 13, 2014 purchase agreement between the Appellants and Veracity, LLC constituted fair market value for the vacant lot in Rankin County. Applying that rate to the parcel as a whole, which Veracity, LLC did, in fact, later purchase from the Appellee, the vacant lot would have had a fair market value of approximately Two Million Nine Hundred Forty Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($2,940,300.00), meaning the actual price that the Appellee paid at the foreclosure sale only represented less than twenty-seven percent (>27%) of the actual fair market value of the parcel, as evidenced by what another buyer had already offered to the Appellants. We also know that the proposed buyers, Veracity, LLC, were, in fact, interested in a larger tract of the parcel, and, in fact, all of the parcel, as evidenced by their attempt to purchase more of the parcel from the Appellants and their later purchase of the entire parcel from the Appellee. (C.P. 312-321). For this reason, it is entirely reasonable to apply the price agreed on in the November 13, 2014 purchase 10
agreement to the parcel as a whole to determine the actual fair market value of the vacant lot in Rankin County. For these reasons, it is absolutely clear that a genuine issue of material fact exists such that summary judgment was clearly improperly granted. The issue of fair market value is ultimately a jury question, and should be treated as such, but even still, it is clear from the analysis provided that the purchase price on at least the vacant lot in Rankin County is inadequate as a matter of law. As such, the grant of summary judgment by the lower court should be reversed. iii. The appraisals on the properties were deficient. Not withstanding the fact that the appraisals that ended up being used to more-or-less determine the fair market value of the parcels by the lower court were authored at the request of the Appellee, the appraisals were simply inadequate as a proper metric of value for the subject parcels. As to determining fair market value of real property, the Supreme Court has stated that Three standards are accepted in determining fair market value for real property: (1) the cost approach, (2) the income-capitalization approach, and (3) the market-data or comparative sales approach. Gulf South Pipeline Company, LP v. Pitre, 35 So.3d 494 (Miss. 2010) (citing Rebelwood, Ltd. v. Hinds County, 544 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1989) and Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Franklin County Timber Co., 488 So.2d 782 (Miss. 1986). These approaches do not, considered singly, establish value. Each rather is one approach to value, with the appraiser s estimate of value being, in the end, an opinion which is the product of a reconciliation of the indications yielded by the three approaches. Id. Certainly, when appraising an owner s interest in commercial property, all three methods of valuation could be relevant and useful and, at minimum, should be considered. Eller Media Co. v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 882 11
So.2d 198 (Miss. 2004). An appraisal received criticism from the Mississippi Supreme Court that did not take into consideration factors such as the monthly income the property had been generating or the potential uses of the building. Allied Steel at 119. Important to any analysis or discussion of appraisal methods is an understanding of the various types used. In short, the cost approach seeks to determine how much a property would cost to replace, the income-capitalization approach seeks to determine the value of a property based on any income that it may generate for its owner, and the market-data or comparative sales approach seeks to determine the value of a property based on what comparable properties ( comps ) have sold for recently in the vicinity of the subject property. A review of the Appellee s appraisal reports reveals that the Rankin County properties were appraised using the comparative sales and income capitalization approaches, while the Yazoo County property was appraised using the comparative sales and cost approaches, and that additionally, the Yazoo County property appraisal did not include the value of any timber located on it. (C.P. 68-260). Obviously, certain appraisal methods make sense for some properties that simply do not make sense for other properties. The Court says exactly this in Eller Media, and while it declines to say that all three methods are necessary to have a valid appraisal, it does indicate that the most common sense approaches should be employed for the property in question. Here, the various parcels were appraised using either a worthless method, or in some instances, a potentially useful method was not employed. With regard to the bowling alley parcel in Rankin County, a comparative sales approach was applied to render an appraisal for a bowling alley that, at the time and at present, is the only bowling alley in all of Rankin County or Madison County, and is over twenty (20) miles from the nearest bowling alley in Hinds County. There are, 12
in fact, two bowling alleys, in Hinds County, Metro 24 Bowling Center in Jackson and Indian Lanes in Clinton. The Appellee s appraisal report obviously did not include these bowling alleys because they have not recently been the subject of a sale, but even more importantly, the appraisal report uses six commercial sales of large box retail warehouse facilities in the Jackson Metropolitan area, instead. (C.P. 122-131). The report goes on to state: As previously mentioned, if the subject property were to sell, it is doubtful the property would be utilized as a bowling alley. The most probable use for the building... [is as a] retail or retail warehouse. (C.P. 130). It is unmistakable from the clear language of the appraisal report that the value assigned to the property was based on the property being used as something other than a bowling alley. It is a matter of fact that the subject property was sold by the Appellee to a third party after the foreclosure sale, and that the subject property does, in fact, still operate as a bowling alley, under the name of Fannin Lanes. With regard to the large parcel in Yazoo County, despite repeatedly referencing the parcel as recreational timberland in the appraisal report, it is clear that the Appellee s appraisal report does not include the value of the timber on the parcel, even though the comparable parcels used for the appraisal indicate timber values in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in some instances. It is clear from the Allied Steel decision that it is error to not consider additional income opportunities contained on a parcel, such as timber. (C.P. 194-260). For these reasons, the grant of summary judgment to the Appellee is clearly improper, as the foregoing constitute simple, articulable issues of material fact that were not considered by the trial court. Both the Final Judgment and the transcript of the Summary Judgment proceedings are completely devoid of any reference by the court indicating that it had taken these matters into consideration. As such, the grant of summary judgment must be reversed. 13
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse and remand the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rankin County, Mississippi. Respectfully submitted, BY: /s/ Pamela L. Hancock Pamela L. Hancock (MSB# 10676) Attorney for Appellants Of Counsel: Pamela L. Hancock (MSB# 10676) Jeffrey B. McGuire (MSB# 104622) HANCOCK LAW FIRM, PLLC Post Office Box 1078 Ridgeland, Mississippi 39158 Telephone: (601) 853-2223 Facsimile: (601) 853-9693 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Pamela L. Hancock, do hereby certify that I have this day electronically filed the foregoing Brief of the Appellants with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system, which issued electronic notification of such filing to: Scott R. Hendrix, Esq. R. Brannon Kahlstorf, Esq. MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS, P.A. Post Office Box 7120 Tupelo, Mississippi 38802 Further, I hereby certify that I have also this day mailed a hard copy to the following persons not notified by the MEC system by United States mail, first class postage prepaid: Honorable Steve S. Ratcliff, III Circuit Court Judge, District 20 Post Office Box 1626 Canton, Mississippi 39046 SO CERTIFIED, this the 12 th day of May, 2017. BY: /s/ Pamela L. Hancock Pamela L. Hancock (MSB# 10676) Attorney for Appellants 15