M5110, Part 1A Land Tenure and Land Policy Definitions, Theory, Objectives Prof. Franz Heidhues Dr. Andreas Neef Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 1 Structure of the lecture Introduction Agrarian reform and land reform Land reform and structural policy Land allocation model Objectives Part I 1. The concept of land tenure and types of tenure regimes Definitions 2. Land tenure, natural resource management and agricultural development Theory and evidence 3. Land conflicts Problems and solutions Part II 4. Land reform registration redistribution, resettlement 5. Rights of women and tenants Discrimination or empowerment? 6. Land policy Principles and instruments Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 2
Rural institutional framework Land tenure system Legal and social framework Agricultural and rural services Property regimes Rental/ Leasing systems Examples -Inheritance -Gender roles Examples: - rural finance - marketing - extension Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 3 Agricultural Policy Instruments Structural policies Aimed at fundamental changes in property rights and access to resources Marginal policies Aimed at improving use of resources, efficiency of resource allocation and income distribution Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 4
Allocation Effects of Land Distribution Large Scale Farm Sector (Latifundia) Small Scale Farm Sector (Family Farms) Output Output B L1 B L0 Land B M0 B M1 Land Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 5 Land reform registration, redistribution, resettlement? Possible goals of land reform 1.Political goals Adjust village social and power structures Reduce the inequality of landholdings, partition of large farms Satisfy smallholders, leaseholders and landless people Redistribute existing land 2. Agrarian policy goals Promote family-based farming Reorganize the farm size structure 3. Economic goals Intensify agricultural production, mobilize the agricultural production Growth potential Diversify agricultural production, colonize new land Create additional employment opportunities 4. Social goals Distribute income and capital of the rural population more equally Equity Improve the social status of the rural population Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 6
Types of tenure regimes (I) Four major types of property regimes can be distinguished: 1. Private property regimes Private owners have the right to undertake socially acceptable use of their property Private property rights include the right of transferring the object to somebody else and the right to exclude others from the use (i.e. sell, rent, use if as collateral inherit.) Share cropping 2. Common property regimes The owners ( management group ) have the right to exclude nonmembers of the group from use Individual members of the management group have both rights and duties with respect to use rates and maintenance of the thing owned. Transfer rights are often restricted and subject to decision of group leaders or the group as a whole. In case of leaving the community, rights fall back to the community Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 7 Types of tenure regimes (II) Four major types of property regimes can be distinguished: 3. State property regimes State property regimes have often resulted from the nationalization of common property regimes (e.g. some Sahelian countries) or private property regimes (e.g. Vietnam) Rights of groups and individuals are determined by controlling agencies (e.g. Dept. Of Land Administration of Forest Administration). Users have the duty to observe use and access rules formulated by state law and controlled by these agencies. 4. Open-access or non-property regimes Open-access regimes result from the absence or the breakdown of a management and authority system whose purpose it was to introduce and enforce a set of rules among the potential users of a certain resource. Open-access regimes have often been confused with common property regimes Open-access frequently results from the undermining or collapse of customary (common) property regimes. Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 8
Evaluation Criteria for Agricultural Reforms or different tenure regimes Growth Objective Efficiency of resource allocation Promotion of innovation - incentives - risks - durability of use Optimal farm size Employment Stability Distribution Objective Access to land markets Access to other markets - product markets - input markets - financial markets - extension Conservation of Natural Resources use of common property, tragedy of the commons (Hardin) internalization of costs Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 9 Figure: Land registration and farm productivity Supply of land titles or land use certificates by the state increased willingness to invest in natural resources enhanced land security development of a land market increased ability to use land as collateral maintaining and conserving natural resources increased willingness to invest, efficient cropping choices development of formal credit markets increased stability of natural resource base in agriculture efficient allocation of land resources improved ability to invest Source: based on Platteau 1992 increased productivity and capital accumulation in the agricultural sector Improvement of access to resources, productivity and income of the poor Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 10
Figure: Land titling and farm productivity More security to farmer Titled land More security to lender More demand for investment More supply of long-term credit More long-term investment More demand for variable input More supply of short-term credit More variable input use Higher output per acre Higher land prices Higher farm income Source: Feder and Noronha 1987; GTZ 1998 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 11 Success of agricultural reform is depending on: Rapidity of change (revolution with instability versus evolutionary change) Preparation and training of the new owners, promotion of the school system Socio-economic infrastructural and institutional support framework (conducive price policy, supply with inputs, marketing, credit, extension) Existence and Profitability of an innovation package Functioning of land market (requires clearly formulated land laws and regulations) Adequate financing Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 12
Causes for failures of land reforms unsatisfactory financing of ambitious land reform programs unclearly formulated land laws and regulations uncertainty about existing land rights unsatisfactory competence of administration for the implementation of reforms Lack of enforcement of land reform laws (weak government) Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 13 M5110 Part 1 B Land Tenure and Land Policy Tenants and land rights Prof. Franz Heidhues Dr. Andreas Neef Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 14
Tenant s land rights Leasing contracts are often not done on a written basis Tenant s use rights are often short-term (tenure insecurity) Tenants face several restrictions to land use (e.g. no perennial crops) Sharecroppers often lack incentives to invest (return must be shared with the owner) Tenants often get fields with low soil fertility and/or far from settlement Tenants do not have incentives to increase soil fertility (fear of losing the land) Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 15 Table: Land use systems and land tenure status of different minority groups in Song Da watershed, Son La province, northwestern Vietnam Ethnic group Valley based systems Upland based systems Paddy based system Diversified system Medium attitudes (<800 masl) High attitudes (>800 masl) Thai 93% 73% 48% 1% Hmong 0% 0% 0% 99% Other ethnic groups 7% 27% 52% 0% Land tenure status Red book certificate/permitted 48% 66% 25% 5% tenure Without permits 51% 34% 73% 95% rented 1% 2% 2% 0% Source: SFDP 1994 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 16
Table: Impact of land tenure on crop yields in Southwest Niger and Southern Benin Owneroperated fields Tenantoperated fields Analysis of variance (ANOVA) Average yield of millet in kg per ha (Southwest Niger) 376.3 205.2 P-level=0.001** Average yield of corn in kg per ha (Southern Benin) 650.0 345.2 P-level=0.018* Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 17 Table: Impact of land tenure on number of planted trees/perennial crops per ha in Southern Benin Fields cultivated by land owners (long-term use rights) Fields cultivated by non-owners (medium-term use rights) Fields cultivated by non-owners (short-term use rights) Number of planted trees per ha 212.8 26.0 6.3 Analysis of variance ANOVA P-level=0.0445* Source: Neef 1999 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 18
Table: Strategies of farmers to secure land rights in two villages situated in a reforestation area of northern Thailand (sample of 30 households per village) Strategies to secure land rights Planting of fruit trees Planting of other perennial crops (e.g. tea) Converting rainfed fields into paddy fields Abandoning fallow systems Applying erosion control measures Construction of fences Percentage of respondents 85% 15% 22% 22% 13% 8% Data from Knüpfer 1997 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 19 M5110 Part 1C Land Tenure and Land Policy Legal Pluralism and Land Conflicts Prof. Franz Heidhues Dr. Andreas Neef Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 20
Common property or open access regimes Rules and mechanisms for the internal governance of common property regimes Clear boundaries and membership of groups Clear definitions of rights and duties of members Clear rules of resource use Monitoring mechanisms Sanctions in case of misbehavior Conflict resolution mechanisms Incentives for group members to work and to invest Source: Ostrom, 1990 Wachter 1992 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 21 3. Land Conflicts Problems and Solutions Land conflicts arise primarily if Land resources are extremely scarce Land rights are not clearly defined Different users compete for the same resource Land distribution is extremely unequal Land laws and regulations are contradictory and inconsistent Possibilities for conflict resolutions Out-of-court reconciliation of interests ( settling before judging ) Use of traditional conciliation structures on local level Education and training of governmental and private mediators Source: GTZ 1998 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 22
Figure: Pluralism of use rights on an individually owned field in South- West Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 23 Figure: Dependency of land rights in distance from field to farm (case study from Niger, West Africa) Source: Neef 1999 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 24
Frequent problems with resettlement measures (different farming and cropping systems, space problem) Appropriate selection of settlement sites Assessment of land suitability and environmental impact Financing of the settlement projects Financial share to be paid by the settlers Minimum farm size Support services (extension, credit, infrastructure, etc.) Existing rights of indigenous groups Alternatives to resettlement Intensification of agriculture (more output per hectare) Development of off-farm activities (processing, trade, eco-tourism) Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 25 Resettlement programs Potential of goals of resettlement programs Reduction population pressure Even out of regional disparity Enable landless to have access to land Settling nomads Enable victims of natural catastrophes to find economic alternatives Securing and increasing food production Developing new land Securing border regions Creating new employment opportunities Integration of ethnic groups Source: GTZ 1998 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 26
Figure: Land concentration in Southwest Niger (West Africa) Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 27 Figure: Relationship between population density and land distribution Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 28
5110 Part 1D Land Tenure and Land Policy Land rights and gender Prof. Franz Heidhues Dr. Andreas Neef Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 29 Rights of women and tenants Discrimination and empowerment? Woman s land rights Opportunities for women to gain access to land vary strongly from region to region In general women are in a weaker position than man In most rural societies women are excluded from the right of inheritance Women s land rights are often only indirectly defined (e.g. through their husbands) Women s use rights are often granted on a short-term basis only Women are usually disadvantaged by land registration programs In case of land conflicts, women usually have problems in enforcing their claims Women develop a variety of strategies to gain access to land Women search for alternatives to land access in the nonagricultural sector Source: GTZ 1998 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 30
Gender-specific differences in durability of land property and use rights (Niger, West Africa) Long term property and use rights Medium term use rights Short term use rights Total area Fields under control of male household heads 52.0% 33.8% 14.2% 100.0% Fields under control of female household heads 14.0% 17.9% 68.2% 100.0% Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 31 Figure: Gender specific differences of traditional and improved rice production systems (Niger, West Africa) Source: Neef 1999 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 32
Table: Impact of access land on women s income in Southwest Niger Average income from crop Average gross margin per hectare (in FCFA) Total average income (in FCFA) <0.3 ha 18,564 207,693 58,539 0.3-0.6 ha 41,506 84,975 44,062 >0.6 ha 45,057 52,646 54,563 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) P-level=0.005** P-level=0.022* P-level=0.707 Source: Neef 1999 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 33 Table: Impact of access to land on women s income in Southern Benin Total average income (in FCFA) average income from agro-processing (in FCFA) Women with access to land 18,564 58,539 Women without access to land 41,506 44,062 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) P-level=0.005** P-level=0.707 Source: Neef 1999 Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 34
Literature Bromley, D. 1989. Property Relations and Economic Development: The Other Land Reform. World Development 17(6): 867-877. Deininger, K. 2003. Land policies for growth and poverty reduction. A World Bank Policy Research Report. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Washington, D.C. Feder, G. and R. Noronha 1987. Land rights systems and agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank Research Observer 2(2): 143-169. GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) (ed.) 1998. Land tenure in development cooperation: Guiding principles. Universum Verlagsanstalt, Wiesbaden. Meinzen-Dick, R. et al. (eds.) 2002. Innovation in natural resource management: The role of property rights and collective action in developing countries. Neef, A. 1999. Auswirkungen von Bodenrechtswandel auf Ressourcennutzung und wirtschaftliches Verhalten von Kleinbauern in Niger und Benin. Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. Neef, A. & R. Schwarzmeier 2001. Land tenure and rights in trees and forests: Interdependencies, dynamics and the role of development cooperation Case studies from Mainland Southeast Asia. GTZ, Eschborn. Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 35 Literature (cont d) Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, New York. Ostrom, E. 2001. The puzzle of counterproductive property rights reforms: A conceptual analysis. In: de Janvry, A., Gordillo, G., Platteau, J.-P., Sadoulet, E. (eds.) Access to land, rural poverty and public action. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Wachter, D. 1992. Land titling for land conservation in developing countries? Divisional Working Paper No. 1992-28. The World Bank Environment Department, Washington, DC. Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 36