BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION RESPONDENT DURWARD JAMIESON LONG, JR.'S

ORIGINAL BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION In the Matter of: DURWARD JAMIESON LONG, JR., ) ) Attorney-Respondent, ) ) No. 3124587. ) Commission No. 2017PR00083 RESPONDENT DURWARD JAMIESON LONG, JR.'S ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT Now comes Respondent, Durward Jamieson Long, Jr. ("Respondent"), by Daniel F. Konicek of Konicek & Dillon, P.C. admits that he was licensed to practice on November 5, 1979, but denies the conclusory portions of the remaining allegations of the prefatory paragraph and answers as follows: Count I (Unreasonable fee and improper business transaction with clients Twyla Matheny and Juston Vermost to obtain the fee) 1. On May 8, 2006, Twyla Matheny ("Matheny"), who was then 78 years old, executed a power of attorney for property naming her grandson, Juston Vermost ("Vermost"), as her agent. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1. 2. In or about 2010, Matheny began to develop dementia. Her cognitive capacity precipitously declined, and on or about June 23, 2014, following a hospitalization after a fall, she was admitted to Hillcrest Nursing Home in Geneseo, Illinois. ANSWER: Respondent does not have sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 and therefore denies the same and demands strict proof thereof. 3. As of August 2014, Matheny's income consisted of monthly Social Security benefits. Matheny's only significant asset was a house, titled in her name, with a tax assessment valuation of $57,000. Page 1 of22

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 3. 4. On August 12, 2014, Vermost had a consultation with Respondent on the subject of Matheny's financial circumstances and her eligibility for Medicaid benefits in order to afford long-term care at the nursing home. They agreed that Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long & Associates, would represent Matheny and Vermost as Matheny's agent under the power of attorney, in the completion of an application to the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") for Medicaid benefits. Respondent charged, and Vermost paid, a legal fee in the amount of $250 for the consultation. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 4. 5. On August 13, 2014, Vermost returned to Respondent's office. They agreed that Matheny would pay a fixed legal fee to Respondent in the amount of $12,500 for the preparation and filing of an application to the DHS for Medicaid benefits for Matheny; that Vermost, as Matheny's agent, would execute a promissory note to Respondent for that sum; and that the promissory note and legal fee would be secured by a mortgage against Matheny's house. ANSWER: Respondent admits the first sentence of Paragraph 5. Respondent denies the first portion of the second sentence; the Respondent admits the second portion of the second sentence; the Respondent admits that the Promissory Note was secured by a mortgage against the real property described as "Matheny's House". 6. On August 13, 2014, Respondent and Vermost as Matheny's agent executed a representation contract that provided for the $12,500 fixed fee. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations in Paragraph 6. 7. Also on that date, Vermost, acting as Matheny's agent, signed a promissory note that Respondent had prepared that committed Matheny to pay $12,500 to "Jamieson Long and Associates, Attorneys at Law," in consideration of legal services to be rendered. The note provided that the principal amount would be paid in full upon the sale of Matheny's house in the future. Vermost, as Matheny's agent, also signed a mortgage that granted "Jamieson Long and Associates" an interest in Matheny's house to secure the promissory note. ANSWER: The Respondent admits all of the first sentence of Paragraph 7, except for that portion which states "in consideration of legal services to be rendered." The Respondent admits all of the second sentence of Paragraph 7. The Respondent admits all of the third sentence of Paragraph 7, except the portion that states "an interest." 8. On September 2, 2014, Respondent recorded the mortgage in the Henry County, Illinois, County Clerk's office. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 8. Page 2 of22

9. In relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage against Matheny, Respondent placed his own financial interests in direct conflict with the financial interests of Matheny and Vermost in his capacity as Matheny's agent. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 9. 10. At no time did Respondent advise Vermost or Matheny that, in relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage, his interests conflicted with their interests. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 10. 11. At no time did Respondent inform Vermost or Matheny, in writing or otherwise, that they were entitled to seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, in relation to the promissory note and the mortgage. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 11. 12. At no time did Respondent obtain Vermost's or Matheny's informed consent, in a writing signed by Vermost or Matheny, to the essential terms of the transaction by which Respondent obtained the promissory note and the security interest in Matheny' s home and Respondent's role in the transaction, including whether he was representing Vermost and Matheny in the transaction. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 12. Further answer, the documentation executed by Vermost is evidence of the informed consent. 13. As of November 26, 2014, Respondent had performed little or no work in relation to Matheny's Medicaid application. On November 26, 2014, Hillcrest nursing home reminded Respondent that there was no application on file. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 13. 14. Between November 26, 2014, and December 30, 2014, Respondent completed the Medicaid application for Matheny. On December 30, 2014, Respondent submitted Matheny's application to DHS. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 14. 15. At the time Respondent prepared and filed Matheny's application, a Medicaid application consisted of the completion of a questionnaire provided by DHS that required personal and financial information about the applicant. The application required the attachment of personal and financial records. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 15. Page 3 of22

16. After filing Matheny's application on December 30, 2014, Respondent did little or no further work on Matheny's behalf. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 16. 17. On or about April 1, 2015, DHS approved Matheny's application for Medicaid benefits. ANSWER: Respondent admits that DHS approved Matheny's application for Medicaid benefits on or about April 1, 2015 with benefits approved back to September 1, 2014. 18. On April 24, 2015, Matheny passed away. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 18. 19. As of April 24, 2015, Respondent had provided no significant services to Matheny other than the completion and submission of her Medicaid application. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 19. 20. On July 14, 2015, Matheny's estate sold her home for $26,000. Respondent obtained $12,500 of the sale proceeds pursuant to the representation contract, promissory note and mortgage described in paragraphs 5 through 8, above. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 20. 21. The $12,500 fee that Respondent obtained for the completion and filing of Matheny's Medicaid application was unreasonable considering the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the likelihood that the matter would preclude other employment, the fee customarily charged for similar legal services, and the amount of Matheny's assets involved. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 21. 22. At the time Respondent collected the $12,500 fee, he knew that he had provided no significant services to Matheny other than the completion and submission of her Medicaid application. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 22. 23. By reason of his conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. making an agreement for, charging or collecting an unreasonable fee, by conduct including charging and collecting $12,500 for assisting in Twyla Matheny's Page 4 of22

application for Medicaid benefits, in violation of Rule l.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (201 O); and b. knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client, by conduct including acquiring a promissory note from Twyla Matheny and Juston Vermost as Matheny's agent, and acquiring a mortgage interest against Matheny' s home and recording the mortgage, without informing Matheny or her agent Vermost in writing that they may seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, and without obtaining the informed consent of Matheny or Vermost, in a writing signed by Matheny or Vermost, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction, in violation of Rule l.8(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 23. Count II (Conflict of interest in the representation of Twyla Matheny's estate) 24. The Administrator realleges paragraphs 1 through 22 of Count I, above. ANSWER: Respondent repeats his answers of Count I above. 25. Matheny left a will that named Vermost as the sole beneficiary and designated him to serve as executor of her estate. The will named Matheny's children as contingent beneficiaries. At the time of her death, Matheny's house was the only asset of her estate. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 25. 26. On or about May 7, 2015, Respondent and Vermost agreed that Respondent's law firm, Jamieson Long and Associates, would represent Matheny's estate and Vermost as the executor of the estate in the probate of Matheny's will. Respondent and Vermost agreed that the law firm would receive a flat fee in the amount of $2,000 for the completion of the probate matter. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 26. 27. On June 12, 2015, Attorney H. Reed Doughty ("Doughty"), who was an employee of Respondent, filed Matheny's will along with a petition for probate of will and related probate pleadings in the Circuit Court for Henry County, Illinois. The matter was docketed as case number 15-P-80 and titled, In the Matter of the Estate of Twyla Matheny, Deceased, and proceeded as an independent administration of the decedent's estate. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 27. 28. Respondent directed Doughty to file, or he knew that Doughty would file, the probate proceeding and appear for the law firm in representing Matheny's estate. After Doughty Page 5 of22

had filed the probate case, Respondent learned that Doughty had done so. Respondent had managerial authority over Doughty, direct supervisory authority over Doughty, or both. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 28. 29. As the holder of the promissory note and mortgage obligation described in paragraphs 5 through 8 in Count I, above, the interests of Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long and Associates, conflicted with the interests of the estate Twyla Matheny and with the interests of Vermost as the executor of the estate, because Respondent and his law firm possessed a security interest in the only probate asset- Matheny's home. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 29. 30. At no time did Respondent or Doughty advise Vermost that Respondent's and the law firm's interests conflicted with the interests of Matheny's estate. At no time did Respondent or Doughty communicate to Vermost information and explanation about the material risks of, and reasonably available alternatives to, Respondent's and the law firm's representation of Matheny's estate. ANSWER: Respondent denies a conflict existed and therefore admits he did not communicate or explain to Vermost the matters alleged. 31. At no time did Respondent or Doughty obtain Vermost's informed consent to Respondent's and his law firm's representation of Matheny's estate. Respondent did not at any time instruct Doughty to disclose the conflict of interest to Vermost or obtain Vermost's informed consent to their representation of Matheny's estate. ANSWER: Respondent denies a conflict existed and therefore admits he did not communicate or explain to Vermost the matters alleged. 32. In or about June 2015, Vermost entered into an agreement with John J. Stevenson and Joy B. Stevenson ("Stevensons") for the Stevensons to purchase Matheny's home from her estate forthe gross sum of$26,000. Vermost retained the law firm ofnash, Nash, Bean and Ford to represent the estate in the completion of that transaction. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 32. 33. On July 14, 2015, Vermost and the Stevensons closed the above transaction. Respondent received $12,500 from the proceeds of the sale in satisfaction of the representation contract, promissory note and mortgage described in paragraphs 5 through 8, above. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 33. 34. Following the disbursement of $12,500 to Respondent and the payment of other fees and costs that Matheny's estate incurred in the completion of the transaction, the net proceeds of the sale ofmatheny's house totaled $7,154.53. Matheny's estate had no other funds or assets. Page 6 of22

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 34. 35. The funds in Matheny's estate were insufficient to pay all of the claims against the estate, including the agreed $2,000 legal fee for Respondent's law firm's representation of the estate. As a result, on or about February 8, 2016, Respondent received a prorated fee in the amount of $1,268.18. Unpaid claims against the estate totaled $20,995.90 (including the balance of Respondent's fee and a lien claimed by Medicaid for the amount of $13,667.50). No funds remained for Vermost to receive as the beneficiary. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 35. 36. By reason of his conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. representing a client when there is a significant risk that the representation of the client will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer, by conduct including that Respondent and his law firm represented the estate of Twyla Matheny while concurrently having and enforcing a claim against the estate, which consisted of a mortgage against Matheny's home, in violation of Rule l.7(a)(2) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 36. Count III (Improper business transaction with clients Bertha Brokaw and Linda Raske in order to obtain attorney fee) 37. On December 5, 2003, Bertha M. Brokaw ("Brokaw"), who was then 75 years old, executed a power of attorney for property naming her daughter, Linda S. Raske ("Raske"), as her agent. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 37. 38. In or about 2010, Brokaw began to develop dementia. Her cognitive capacity declined, and on or about January 2011, she was admitted to Good Samaritan Society Home in Geneseo, Illinois. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 38. 39. As of January 2011, Brokaw's income consisted of pension benefits from the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund and the Rail Road Retirement Board that totaled approximately $1,600 per month. Brokaw's only significant asset was a house, titled in her name, with a market value of approximately $50,000. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 but states that the market value of the home was approximately $77,000. Page 7 of22

40. In January 2011, Raske had a consultation with Respondent on the subject of her mother's financial circumstances and her eligibility for Medicaid benefits in order to afford long term care at the nursing home. Raske and Respondent agreed that Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long & Associates, would represent Brokaw and Raske as Brokaw's agent under the power of attorney in the completion of an application to the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") for Medicaid benefits and in the sale ofbrokaw's home. They agreed that Brokaw would pay a fixed legal fee to Respondent in the amount of$15,000; that Raske would pay $7,500 of the fee to Respondent in advance; that Raske, as Brokaw's agent, would execute a promissory note to Respondent for the remaining $7,500 of the fee; and that the promissory note would be secured by a mortgage against Brokaw's house and would be paid upon the sale of the home. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 but denies that the contract and the mortgage were signed at the same time, as Raske believed she had a buyer for the home and believed the second $7,500 payment would be paid from the proceeds of that sale prior to the filing of a Medicaid application. It was only after the sale fell through that a mortgage was signed, on May 10, 2011. 41. On January 21, 2011, Respondent and Raske as Brokaw's agent executed a representation contract that provided for the $15,000 fixed fee. At that time, Raske paid $7,500 to Respondent toward the agreed fee. Raske, acting as Brokaw's agent, also signed a promissory note that Respondent had prepared that committed Brokaw to pay $7,500 to "Jamieson Long and Associates, Attorneys at Law." The note provided that the principal amount would be paid in full upon the sale of Brokaw's house in the future. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 but denies that the contract and the mortgage were signed at the same time, as Raske believed she had a buyer for the home within the family and believed the second $7,500 payment would be paid from the proceeds of that sale prior to the filing of a Medicaid application. It was only after the sale fell through that a mortgage was signed, on May 10, 2011. 42. On May 10, 2011, Raske accepted and entered into a contract with Leonuel Bushong and Lynn Bushong for the sale of Brokaw's house to the Bushongs for the price of $50,000. ANSWER: Upon information and belief, Raske entered into a sale contract for the home at an initial price of $54,000 that was later amended to $50,000. Further answering, Respondent does not have sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 42 and therefore deny the same and demand strict proof thereof. 43. Also on May 10, 2011, Raske, as Brokaw's agent, signed a mortgage that Respondent had prepared which granted "Jamieson Long and Associates" an interest in Brokaw's house as security for the previously-signed promissory note. ANSWER: Respondent admits all of the allegations contained in Paragraph 43 except the portion that states "an interest". Page 8 of22

44. On May 16, 2011, Respondent recorded the mortgage in the Henry County, Illinois, County Clerk's office. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 44. 45. In relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage against Brokaw, Respondent placed his own financial interests in direct conflict with the financial interests of Brokaw and Raske in her capacity as Brokaw's agent. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 45. 46. At no time did Respondent advise Raske or Brokaw that, in relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage, his interests conflicted with their interests. 47. At no time did Respondent inform Raske or Brokaw, in writing or otherwise, that they were entitled to seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, in relation to the promissory note and the mortgage. 48. At no time did Respondent obtain Raske's or Brokaw's informed consent, in a writing signed by Raske or Brokaw, to the essential terms of the transaction by which Respondent obtained the promissory note and the security interest in Brokaw's home and Respondent's role in the transaction, including whether he was representing Raske and Brokaw in the transaction. 49. On June 16, 2011, Raske and the Bushongs closed the transaction for the sale of Brokaw's house. Respondent obtained $7,500 of the sale proceeds pursuant to the representation contract, promissory note and mortgage described in the paragraphs above. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 49. 50. By reason of his conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client, by conduct including acquiring a promissory note from Bertha Brokaw and Linda Raske as Brokaw's agent, and acquiring a mortgage interest in Page 9 of22

Brokaw's home and recording the mortgage, without informing Brokaw or her agent Raske in writing that they may seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, and without obtaining the informed consent of Brokaw or Raske, in a writing signed by Brokaw or Raske, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction, in violation of Rule l.8(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 50. Count IV (Improper business transaction with clients Ira Dwight Hampton and Dale Wiersema Jn order to obtain attorney fee) 51. Beginning in approximately 2009, Ira Dwight Hampton ("Hampton"), who was then 88 years old and lived in a house by himself, began experiencing loss of balance, dementia, and other health problems that impaired his ability to live alone. Hampton and his family determined to seek a nursing home placement for him. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 51. 52. Hampton's income consisted of Social Security benefits in the amount of $1,3 78 per month and a private pension in the amount of $675 per month. Hampton's only significant asset was his house, which was titled in his name. The market value of the house was uncertain. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 52. 53. On January 26, 2010, Hampton and his son-in-law, Dale Wiersema ("Wiersema"), had a consultation with Respondent on the subject of Hampton's financial circumstances and his eligibility for Medicaid benefits in order to afford long-term care at a nursing home. Following the consultation, Respondent prepared, and Hampton signed, a power of attorney for property naming Wiersema as his agent. ANSWER: Respondent admits that he had a general consultation with Hampton and his son-in-law, Dale Wiersema on January 18, 2010 and that a power of attorney document was signed on January 28, 2010. 54. Also on January 26, 2010, Wiersema and Respondent agreed that Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long & Associates, would represent Hampton and Wiersema as Hampton's agent under the power of attorney in the completion of an application to the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") for Medicaid benefits and in the sale of Hampton's house. They agreed that Hampton would pay a fixed legal fee to Respondent in the amount of$20,000; that Wiersema, as Hampton's agent, would execute a promissory note to Respondent for the fee; and that the promissory note would be secured by a mortgage against Hampton's house and would be paid upon the sale of the home. Page 10 of22

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 54. 55. On February 2, 2010, Respondent and Wiersema as Hampton's agent executed a representation contract that provided for the $20,000 fixed fee. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 55. 56. On July 27, 2010, Wiersema, acting as Hampton's agent, signed a promissory note that Respondent had prepared that committed Hampton to pay $20,000 to "Jamieson Long and Associates, Attorneys at Law" in consideration for the law firm's legal services. The note provided that the principal amount would be paid in full upon the sale of Hampton's house in the future. Wiersema, as Hampton's agent, also signed a mortgage that granted "Jamieson Long and Associates" an interest in Hampton's house to secure the promissory note. ANSWER: Respondent admits all of the first sentence of Paragraph 56 except for that portion which states "in consideration of legal services to be rendered". The Respondent admits all of the second sentence. The Respondent admits all of the third sentence, except the portion that states "an interest". 57. On September 15, 2010, Wiersema entered into a contract with Jeffrey Kerris ("Kerris") for the sale of Hampton's house to Kerris for the price of$40,500. ANSWER: Upon information and belief, Respondent admits that Wiersema entered into a contract with Jeffrey Kerris for the sale of Hampton's house to Kerris on October 30, 2010 following a public auction by Stenzel Auction Service, Inc. 58. On October 15, 2010, Respondent recorded the mortgage that Wiersema had signed in the Rock Island County Recorder's office. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 58. 59. In relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage against Hampton, Respondent placed his own financial interests in direct conflict with the financial interests of Hampton and Wiersema in his capacity as Hampton's agent. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 59. 60. At no time did Respondent advise Wiersema or Hampton that, in relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage, his interests conflicted with their interests. Page 11of22

61. At no time did Respondent inform Wiersema or Hampton, in writing or otherwise, that they were entitled to seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, in relation to the promissory note and the mortgage. 62. At no time did Respondent obtain Wiersema's or Hampton's informed consent, in a writing signed by Wiersema or Hampton, to the essential terms of the transaction by which Respondent obtained the promissory note and the security interest in Hampton's home and Respondent's role in the transaction, including whether he was representing Wiersema and Hampton in the transaction. 63. On February 8, 2011, Respondent obtained $4,050 in partial payment for his $20,000 fee. On March 16, 2011, the transaction for the sale of Hampton's house closed, and Respondent obtained $15,950 from the sale proceeds to complete the payment of his fee under the representation contract, promissory note and mortgage described in the paragraphs above. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 63. 64. By reason of his conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client, by conduct including acquiring a promissory note from Ira Hampton and Dale Wiersema as Hampton's agent, and acquiring a mortgage interest against Hampton's home and recording the mortgage, without informing Hampton or his agent Wiersema in writing that they may seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, and without obtaining the informed consent of Hampton or Wiersema, in a writing signed by Hampton or Wiersema, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction, in violation of Rule l.8(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 64. Count V (Unreasonable fee and improper business transaction with clients Evelyn Johnson and Leslee Collins in order to obtain the fee) Page 12 of22

65. On December 14, 2001, Evelyn V. Johnson ("Johnson"), who was then 75 years old, executed a power of attorney for property naming her daughter, Leslee Collins ("Collins"), as her agent. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 65. 66. In 2013, Johnson's health significantly declined, and Collins determined to find a nursing home placement for her. Johnson's income consisted of Social Security benefits in the approximate amount of$1,220 per month and a private pension in the approximate amount of$240 per month. Johnson's only significant asset was a house, titled in her name, with a tax assessment value of approximately $116,000. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 66 but states that upon information and belief the assessment value was $114,363. 67. On August 19, 2013, Collins had a consultation with Respondent on the subject of Johnson's financial circumstances and her eligibility for Medicaid benefits in order to afford longterm care at a nursing home. They agreed that Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long & Associates, would represent Johnson and Collins as Johnson's agent under the power of attorney in the completion of an application to the Illinois Department of Human Services ("OHS") for Medicaid benefits and in the sale of Johnson's house. They agreed that Johnson would pay a fixed legal fee to Respondent in the amount of $15,000; that Collins, as Johnson's agent, would execute a promissory note to Respondent for that sum; and that the promissory note would be secured by a mortgage against Johnson's house. Respondent charged, and Collins paid, a legal fee in the amount of $250 for the consultation. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 67. 68. On August 23, 2013, Respondent and Collins as Johnson's agent executed a representation contract that provided for the $15,000 fixed fee. At the same time, Collins, acting as Johnson's agent, signed a promissory note that Respondent had prepared that committed Johnson to pay $15,000 to "Jamieson Long and Associates, Attorneys at Law," in consideration of legal services to be rendered. The note provided that the principal amount would be paid in full upon the sale of Johnson's house in the future. Collins, as Johnson's agent, also signed a mortgage that granted "Jamieson Long and Associates" an interest in Johnson's house to secure the promissory note. ANSWER: Respondent admits all of the first sentence, except for that portion which states "in consideration of legal services to be rendered". The Respondent admits all of the second sentence. The Respondent admits all of the third sentence, except the portion that states "an interest". 69. On September 11, 2013, Respondent recorded the mortgage in the Rock Island County Recorder's office. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 69. Page 13 of22

70. On September 28, 2013, Johnson passed away. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 70. 71. In relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage against Johnson, Respondent placed his own financial interests in direct conflict with the financial interests of Johnson and Collins in her capacity as Johnson's agent. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 71. 72. At no time did Respondent advise Collins or Johnson that, in relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage, his interests conflicted with their interests. 73. At no time did Respondent inform Collins or Johnson, in writing or otherwise, that they were entitled to seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, in relation to the promissory note and the mortgage. 74. At no time did Respondent obtain Collins' or Johnson's informed consent, in a writing signed by Collins or Johnson, to the essential terms of the transaction by which Respondent obtained the promissory note and the security interest in Johnson's home and Respondent's role in the transaction, including whether he was representing Collins and Johnson in the transaction. 75. As of September 28, 2013, when Johnson passed away, Respondent had performed little or no work for Johnson. He had represented Johnson only for approximately five weeks. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 75. 76. On May 5, 2014, Johnson's estate sold her home. Respondent obtained $15,000 of the sale proceeds pursuant to the representation contract, promissory note and mortgage described in the paragraphs above. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 76. Page 14 of22

77. The $15,000 fee that Respondent obtained for his representation of Johnson was unreasonable. At the time Respondent collected the fee, he knew that he had provided no significant legal services to Johnson. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 77. 78. By reason of his conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. making an agreement for, charging or collecting an unreasonable fee, by conduct including obtaining a fee of $15,000 for briefly representing Evelyn V. Johnson, in violation of Rule I.S(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and b. knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client, by conduct including acquiring a promissory note from Evelyn V. Johnson and Leslee Collins as Johnson's agent, and acquiring a mortgage interest against Johnson's home and recording the mortgage, without informing Johnson or Collins in writing that they may seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, and without obtaining the informed consent of Johnson or Collins, in a writing signed by Johnson or Collins, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction, in violation of Rule l.8(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 78. Count VI (Conflict of interest in the representation of Evelyn V Johnson's estate) 79. The Administrator re-alleges the paragraphs of Count V, above. ANSWER: Respondent repeats his answers of Count V above. 80. Johnson left a will that named Collins and Collins' sister, Deborah Waters, as her sole beneficiaries and designated Collins to serve as executor of her estate. Johnson's house was the only significant asset of her estate. Respondent and Collins agreed that Respondent and his law firm would represent Johnson's estate and Collins as the executor, in the probate of Johnson's will, and in the sale of Johnson's house. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 80. 81. On October 11, 2013, H. Reed Doughty ("Doughty"), who was an employee of Respondent, filed Johnson's will along with a petition for probate of will and related probate pleadings in the Circuit Court for Rock Island County, Illinois. The matter was docketed as case number 13 P 362 and titled, Estate of Evelyn V Johnson, Deceased, and proceeded as an independent administration of the decedent's estate. Page 15 of22

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 81. 82. Respondent directed Doughty to file, or he knew that Doughty would file, the probate proceeding and appear for the law firm in representing Johnson's estate. After Doughty had filed the probate case, Respondent learned that Doughty had done so. Respondent had managerial authority over Doughty, direct supervisory authority over Doughty, or both. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 82. 83. As the holder of the promissory note and mortgage obligation described in Count V, above, the interests of Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long and Associates, conflicted with the interests of the Johnson estate and with the interests of Collins as the executor of the estate, because Respondent and his law firm possessed a security interest in the only significant probate asset, Johnson's home. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 83. 84. At no time did Respondent or Doughty advise Collins that Respondent's and the law firm's interests conflicted with the interests of Johnson's estate. At no time did Respondent or Doughty communicate to Collins information and explanation about the material risks of, and reasonably available alternatives to, Respondent's and the law firm's representation of Johnson's estate. 85. At no time did Respondent or Doughty obtain Collins' informed consent to Respondent's and his law firm's representation of Johnson's estate. Respondent did not at any time instruct Doughty to disclose the conflict of interest to Collins or obtain her informed consent to their representation of Johnson's estate. 86. In 2014, Collins entered into a contract for the sale of Johnson's house. On or about May 5, 2014, the transaction closed, and Respondent received $15, 000 from the proceeds of the sale in satisfaction of the representation contract, promissory note and mortgage described in the preceding paragraphs. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 86. 87. By reason of his conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. representing a client when there is a significant risk that the representation of the client will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer, by conduct Page 16 of22

including that Respondent and his law firm represented the estate of Evelyn V. Johnson while concurrently having and enforcing a claim against the estate, which consisted of a mortgage against Johnson's home, in violation of Rule l.7(a)(2) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 87. Count VII (Unreasonable fee and improper business transaction with clients Eileen Black and Staci Whitcomb in order to obtain the fee) 88. On November 28, 2011, Eileen Black ("Black"), who was then 85 years old, executed a power of attorney for property naming her daughter, Staci Whitcomb ("Whitcomb"), as her agent. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 88. 89. In or about January 2014, Black, who had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, sustained injuries in a fall and was admitted to Hope Creek Care Center nursing home in Moline, Illinois. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 89 but states that Hope Creek Care Center is located in East Moline, Illinois. 90. As of January 2014, Black's income consisted of Social Security benefits in the approximate amount of $1, 175 per month and a pension in the approximate amount of $13 3 per month. Black's only significant asset was a house, titled in her name, with a tax assessment valuation of $92,500. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 90. 91. On May 30, 2014, the Illinois Department of Human Services ("OHS") approved Medicaid benefits for Black for her nursing home care subject to a "spenddown" in the amount of $98,496. A spenddown is the amount that a recipient of Medicaid, which is need-based, must pay of her own assets for qualifying expenses before Medicaid benefits will be paid. In Black's case, the amount of the spenddown was based mainly on the value of her house. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 91. 92. In September and October 2014, Whitcomb and her sisters, Shelli Norris ("Norris") and Sharon Shaner ("Shaner"), had consultations with Respondent on the subject of Black's financial circumstances and the spenddown required in order for Black to receive Medicaid benefits. Respondent advised the sisters to sell Black's home and that OHS would accept the net proceeds of a fair market sale in satisfaction of the spenddown requirement. Whitcomb, Norris, Shaner and Respondent agreed that Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long & Associates, would represent Black and Whitcomb as Black's agent under the power of attorney, in assisting in Page 17 of22

resolving the spenddown requirement. They agreed that Black would pay a fixed legal fee to Respondent in the amount of $12,500 for that service; that Whitcomb, as Black's agent, would execute a promissory note to Respondent for the $12,500 fee; and that the promissory note and legal fee would be secured by a mortgage against Black's house. Respondent charged, and Whitcomb paid, a legal fee in the amount of $250 for the consultations. ANSWER: Respondent denies that Paragraph 92 is an accurate summary of the facts, events, and contract terms relating to Respondent's meeting with and retention agreement with Whitcomb and her sisters Norris and Shaner. Further answering, Respondent admits that in September and October 2014 he had consultations with Whitcomb, Norris, and Shaner and that Whitcomb, Norris, Shaner and Respondent agreed that Respondent and his law firm, Jamieson Long & Associates, would represent Black and Whitcomb as Black's agent under the power of attorney in: 1) care and care placement issues regarding Eileen Black; 2) Related financial property management matters; 3) Legal, estate, and related financial planning to address the issues surrounding Eileen's need for long term care; 4) Eileen's right under federal and state law pertaining to Medicaid and other medical and custodial care entitlements to pay for Eileen's long term care; 5) Resolving the issues surrounding the $98,496 spenddown and Eileen's current ineligibility for institutional Medicaid; and 6) To the extent deemed appropriate and desirable, strategies to maximize the use of assets for Eileen's supplemental needs. Respondent admits the third and fourth sentences of Paragraph 92. 93. On October 8, 2014, Respondent and Whitcomb as Black's agent executed a representation contract that provided for the $12,500 fixed fee. The contract specifically excluded representation of Whitcomb and Black in the sale of Black's real estate. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 93. 94. Also on October 8, 2014, Whitcomb, acting as Black's agent, signed a promissory note that Respondent had prepared that committed Black to pay $12,500 to "Jamieson Long & Associates, Attorneys at Law, 11 in consideration oflegal services to be rendered. The note provided that the principal amount would be paid in full upon the sale of Black's house in the future. Whitcomb, as Black's agent, also signed a mortgage that granted "Jamieson Long & Associates" an interest in Black's house to secure the promissory note. ANSWER: Respondent admits all of the first sentence, except for the portion which states "in consideration of legal services to be rendered". The Respondent admits all of the second sentence. The Respondent admits all of the third sentence except the portion that states "an interest". 95. On February 7, 2015, Whitcomb entered into a contract with Franklin Davis, Jr. and Chonya Davis ("the Davises") for the sale of Black's house to the Davises for the price of $90,750. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 95 but states that, upon information and belief, the sale price was $89,000. Page 18 of22

96. On February 27, 2015, Respondent recorded the above-described mortgage for legal fees in the Rock Island County, Illinois, County Clerk's office. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 96 but states that the mortgage was signed and dated October 8, 2014 but recorded on February 27, 2015. 97. In relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage against Black, Respondent placed his own financial interests in direct conflict with the financial interests of Black and Whitcomb in his capacity as Black's agent. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 97. 98. At no time did Respondent advise Whitcomb or Black that, in relation to the promissory note and mortgage, and the recording of the mortgage, his interests conflicted with their interests. 99. At no time did Respondent inform Whitcomb or Black, in writing or otherwise, that they were entitled to seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, in relation to the promissory note and the mortgage. 100. At no time did Respondent obtain Whitcomb's or Black's informed consent, in a writing signed by Whitcomb or Black, to the essential terms of the transaction by which Respondent obtained the promissory note and the security interest in Black's home and Respondent's role in the transaction, including whether he was representing Whitcomb and Black in the transaction. 101. On March 9, 2015, Whitcomb and the Davises closed their transaction for the sale of Black's home to the Davises, and Respondent received $12,500 from the proceeds of the sale in satisfaction of the representation contract, promissory note and mortgage described in the preceding paragraphs. Black received $57,614.06 of the sale proceeds after deductions and disbursements for transaction costs and the payment ofliens, including Respondent's mortgage. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 101. 102. Respondent did not represent Whitcomb and Black in the transaction for the sale of Black's home. Page 19 of22

ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 102. 103. On March 17, 2015, Respondent's assistant spoke with a representative of DHS about the sale of Black's home and a corresponding reduction of the spenddown amount that DHS required in order for Black to obtain Medicaid benefits. Respondent's assistant sent to DHS the HUD- I settlement statement for the sale transaction. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 103 but, further answering, states that there were a series of communications between DHS and Respondent's office. 104. On May 8, 2015, DHS adjusted Black's required spenddown to $56,623.12. ANSWER: Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 104. 105. Other than consulting with Whitcomb and her sisters and communicating with DHS, Respondent performed little or no legal services for Black. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 105. 106. The $12,500 fee that Respondent obtained from Black was unreasonable considering the time and labor required of Respondent, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the likelihood that the matter would preclude other employment, and the fee customarily charged for similar legal services. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 106. 107. At the time Respondent collected the $12,500 fee, he knew that the fee was unreasonable, and he knew that he had not provided services that justified that fee. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 107. 108. By reason of his conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. making an agreement for, charging or collecting an unreasonable fee, by conduct including charging and collecting $12,500 from Eileen Black, in violation of Rule l.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (201 O); and b. knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client, by conduct including acquiring a promissory note from Eileen Black and Staci Whitcomb as Black's agent, and acquiring a mortgage interest against Black's home and recording the mortgage, without informing Black and her agent Whitcomb in writing that they may seek the advice of independent legal counsel and have a reasonable opportunity to do so, and without obtaining the informed consent of Black or Whitcomb, in a writing signed by Black or Whitcomb, Page 20 of22

to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction, m violation of Rule l.8(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 108. prejudice. WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that this Amended Complaint be dismissed with Daniel F. Konicek (6205408) KONICEK & DILLON, P.C. 21 West State St. Geneva, IL 60134 630.262.9655 dan@konicekdillonlaw.com Copy to: Tammy L. Evans tevans@iardc.org Gary S. Rapaport grapaport@iardc.org Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission 3161 West White Oaks Drive, Ste. 301 Springfield, IL 62704 ardceservice@iardc.org Page 21 of22