Ongoing changes in land governance and dynamics of land markets in sub-saharan African cities

Transcription

1 Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty April Session: Dealing with urban readjustment Ongoing changes in land governance and dynamics of land markets in sub-saharan African cities Alain Durand-Lasserve Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique France LAM Laboratory, Institute of Political Sciences, Bordeaux, and CNRS

2 1. Objectives - How land market reality (and potential for capturing high land values) can compromise attempts to improve land governance in sub-saharan African cities - Why is it so difficult to improve the functioning of land markets (i.e. to make them more efficient and equitable)? - Refers mainly to situations in Francophone Western and Central African cities over last 20 years (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Togo, ) - Land issues addressed from three interrelated standpoints : Land tenure systems Land governance Land markets. 2

3 3 1. Objectives - Land markets definition: In the narrow sense, land market refers specifically to the allocation or transfer of land rights that involve monetary transactions ; In a broader sense, it refers to all forms of land delivery, which include allocation or transfer through grants, permits, lease or sale. - Land markets characterized by : Actors / stakeholders involved ; Land rights delivered or transferred (formal, customary, informal) ; Formality / legality of transaction ; Security of tenure provided. Very strong interactions between: (i) land tenure system, (ii) land governance, (iii) land markets Need for systemic analysis of these interactions

4 4 LAND TENURE SYSTEMS Legal framework determining the use, allocation and transfer of land Ownership regimes Types of land tenure LAND GOVERNANCE Legal and institutional framework governing land administration Management of public land Production of land related information Land rights registration Land disputes & conflicts resolution LAND MARKETS Functioning of land delivery channels & interactions Actors / stakeholders involved Land rights delivered or transferred Formality / legality of transaction Security of tenure provided

5 5 2. Over the last decade, efforts made by governments in sub-saharan Africa to improve land governance and land markets (African Union, 2009, 2010 & 2011) - Structural measures (changes in legal and regulatory framework) : Adoption of new land codes ; Decentralization in land management and administration ; Registration of land rights and land titling. - Policy measures : Recognition of the diversity and continuum of tenure status and rights ; Improved management of public land. - Adoption of more flexible land management and administration practices : Attempts to set up transparent land administration and information systems ; Tentative simplification of formalisation procedures ; Prevention and resolution of land disputes. - Attempts to liberalizing and unifying land markets : More flexible approaches: towards incremental integration of legal pluralism into land management and administration (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009).

6 3. These changes have been encouraged and supported by International Finance institutions and Aid & Development Agencies (multi & bilateral) - Emphasis put mainly on : Reform of legal framework (Rochegude & Plançon, 2010) ; Implementation of LIS / cadastres (Williamson & al. 2009) ; Land titling programmes to securing land tenure and investments (Payne & al. 2010) ; Support to development of formal land markets (Land Development Agencies). - Two main initiatives : Design and implementation of new land tools (UN-Habitat: Global Land Tools Network) ; Assessment and monitoring tool: World Bank Land Governance Assessment Framework LGAF, a diagnostic tool for the evaluation of the legal framework, policies and practices regarding land and land use). (World Bank, 2010). 6

7 7 4. Significant improvement in land management and administration over the last decades but still limited achievements - Improvement with regards : Recognition of diversity and continuum in land rights ; Tenure formalisation ; Policy with regard to eviction ; Decentralisation. - However, under-estimation of : Social and cultural constraints: land tenure is a social relation ; Political constraints: reforming land management and administration is a highly political matter Vested interests in land administration in relation with land markets - and over-confidence that formalisation & unification of land markets will lead to improved access to land.

8 8 5. Improvements in land governance severely limited by the functioning of land markets - Legal pluralism benefits a wide range of urban stakeholders. - Diversity of land delivery channels / land markets provide land for housing to a diversity of urban income groups. (Wehrmann, 2006, Rakodi & Leduka, 2004). Informal and customary land delivery channels are affordable to the low-incomes, but they do not provide security of tenure (Durand-Lasserve, 2010). Government allocation of administrative permits to occupy provides a more secure tenure, but temporary / revocable and conditional Formal land market of titled land provides a sound level of security of tenure but it exclusively serves the upper urban income groups and is unaffordable for the rest of the population.

9 9 6. Support to development of formal land markets taking place in contexts where government authorities are still playing a key role in land allocation - Land administration procedures introduced by colonisation have been taken over by the newly independent States. - Land laws and codes are still based on the same broad categories of land status put in place by the colonial administration with reference to the civil code (Rochegude & Plançon, 2011). - Common legal framework and land allocation practices : The land belongs to the State ( présomption de domanialité ), unless it has been privately appropriated ; Land for housing allocated by governments through administrative permits (PTO).

10 10 7. Tenure upgrading and changes in land values - Tight relationship between land delivery channel, security of tenure provided, land prices and affordability. - In principle, existing land administration procedures do permit tenure upgrading and formalization. - In reality, tenure formalisation made difficult by administrative practices.

11 Example 1 : Plot of land purchased on informal or customary land market (Peri-urban area of Bamako, Mali, 2012) Document Market value of land - Private land sale agreement on untitled customary land Land sale agreement authenticated by local authority 150 to Transaction recognised by government (PTO or temporary leasehold) 300 to Long-term leasehold or Land title (freehold) 1,000 Example 2 : Allocation of administrative Permit to occupy (PTO) by government (Peri-urban areas of Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, Dakar, Senegal, and Bamako, Mali ) - Plot of land allocated by government (central or local governments) at administrative price with temporary, conditional and revocable PTO. - Land is developed by the beneficiary, which can then benefit a more permanent PTO Land holder can then apply for real rights (long-term leasehold, surface right, freehold). - Land can then be sold out on the formal private land market at a price that can be up to 5 to 8 times higher than administrative price. 11

12 8. Diversity of land delivery channels and corresponding diversity of market value of land is inducing illicit practices - Tenure upgrading is resulting in a massive increase in market value of land but application for tenure improvement / regularization far exceeds the processing capacity of institutions responsible for land administration (which contributes to high prices). - Applications are then selectively processed, priority being given to those applicants who are well connected or can make extra payments to government officers responsible for land allocation, land tenure upgrading and land registration. - Vested interests in land : Within land administration at central government ; Amongst many professionals involved in the process (especially land surveyors). - Widespread corruption in land administration can be observed in all countries of the sub-region. 12

13 8. Diversity of land delivery channels and corresponding diversity of market value of land is inducing illicit practices - At cities level, a considerable share of urban households housing expenditures are illegally confiscated by few hundred of stakeholders involved in land administration - These practices may have important social and macro-economic impacts : Social peace and stability ; Provision of serviced land for housing ; Spatial expansion of cities. - Very well-known phenomenon: anecdotal evidence, however : Poorly documented; Not quantified; 13

14 14 9. Main obstacles in attempts to improving land governance - Improvements in land governance severely limited by corruption and other illicit practices within institutions responsible for land management and administration. - Practices usually covered by governments at the highest level - Compromise the implementation of legal, institutional and policy reform to improve governance in the land sector. - Those people that can design and implement reforms have no interest to do so. - Those people that have interest to change have no power to implement.

15 10. How to minimize opposition within land administrations? - Aware that IFIs and Aid & Development Agencies staff on the field are trying to address these issues. - However, limited latitude: land is a highly protected area. - Main resistance to change in land administration comes from government institutions This issue is frequently underestimated (political correctness / no interference in domestic affairs / State sovereignty). - Resistance to reform the functioning of land markets is compromising attempts to improving land governance (Durand-Lasserve, 2010). - State disengagement from land allocation and land market deregulation : Could be an option (Antwi and Adams, 2003 on Accra) but likely to have severe social impacts 15

16 10. How to minimize opposition within land administrations? - Attempts to uproot corruption in land administration not successful. - Unification of land markets through systematic tiling does not work as expected (Bromley 2008, Payne 2009). - Need to find ways in which the present elite will not loose from change (and not oppose it). - Could focus on land administration procedures and practices by which beneficiaries of predatory practices should not be frontally deprived of their advantages but might be part of a step by step reform process. - Central role of donor agencies could play a key role to promoting practical change. - Need to have better systemic understanding of * Functioning of land delivery systems (land allocation & land markets) * Interactions between land markets practices and land governance framework. 16

17 References African Union (2009). Declaration on land issues and challenges in Africa. Decl. In (XIII) Rev. 1. African Union, African Development Bank & Economic Commission for Africa (2011). Land Policy in Africa. West Africa Regional Assessment. African Union, African Development Bank & Economic Commission for Africa (2010). Land Policy in Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern & Western Africa. Synthesis report. Antwi, A. & Adams, J. (2003). Economic rationality and informal urban land transactions in Accra, Ghana. In: Journal of Property Research, 2003, 20(1) pp Bertrand, M. (1998). Marchés fanciers en transition: la cas de Bamako (Mali). In: Annales de Géographie, n 602,1998, pp , Armand Colin, Paris. Bouju, J., Ausseil, A., Ba, M.F., Ballo, M., Bocoum, H., Touquent, C. (2009). Programme de recherche IRAM : «Dynamiques des transactions foncières, intérêt et impact des intérêts urbains en milieu rural et périurbain». Rapport final, Juin IRAM, CEAMAf (Centre d Études des Mondes africains). 190 p. Bromley, D. W., (2008), Formalising property relations in the developing world: The wrong prescription for the wrong malady Land Use Policy 26 pp Durand-lasserve, A., Le Roy E. (2012) La situation foncière en Afrique à l horizon Agence Française de Développement, African Development Bank. Africa Vision Series «À Savoir». Janvier I

18 Durand-Lasserve, A. (2010). Réguler les Marchés Fonciers pour des Villes Inclusives. In. Regards sur la Terre.Villes, Changer de trajectoire. L annuel du Développement Durable, pp Durand-Lasserve, A., Selod, H. (2009). The formalisation of urban land tenure in developing countries. In Urban Land Markets. Improving land Management for Successful Urbanization, Lall, Freire, Yuen,Rajack, Helluin (Eds). Springer and the World Bank, pp Gough, K.V. & Yankson P.W.K. (2000). Land Markets in African Cities : the Case of Peri-urban Accra, Ghana. Urban Studies, Vol. 37, N 13, Omirin, M.M. and Antwi A.Y. (2004). Informality, Illegality and market Inefficiency: A case for Land market Deregulation in Accra and Lagos. RICS Foundation. Research Paper Series. Payne, G., Durand-Lasserve, A., Rakodi, C. (2009). Social and economic impacts of land titling programmes in urban and peri-urban areas: A short review of the literature. In Urban Land Markets. Improving land Management for Successful Urbanization, Lall, Freire, Yuen, Rajack, Helluin (Eds) Springer and the WorldBank, Rakodi C & Leduka C (2004) Informal land delivery process and access to land for the poor: A Comparative study of six African cities Birmingham: International Development Department, University of Birmingham. Rochegude, A. and Plançon, C. (2010). Décentralisation, acteurs locaux et foncier en Afrique. Mise en perspective juridique des textes sur la décentralisation et le foncier. To be published in Comité Technique Foncier et Développement. Agence Française de Développement, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, France. II

19 UN-Habitat (2010). The State of African Cities Governance, inequalities and urban land markets. United Nations Development Programme (2006). Land rights reform and Governance in Africa. How to make it work in the 21st Century? UNDP, New York. Wehrmann, B. (2006). The dynamics of peri-urban land markets in sub-saharan Africa: adherence to the virtue of common property vs. quest for individual gains. In: Erkunde, Vol 62 N 1, pp Williamson, I., Enemark, S., Wallace, J., Radjabifard, A. (2009). Land Administrartion for Sustainable Development. ESRI Press, New York. World Bank (2010). Land Governance Assessment Framework Manual. World Bank Study on Governance in Land Administration. World Bank (2003). Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. A World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford : Oxford University Press. III