Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA

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1 Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

2 Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

3 Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

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5 Land Rate Building Rate Land Revenue Building Revenue Total Revenue Percent From Land Percent From Buildings $1,120,000 $4,063,000 $5,183,000 22% 78% $1,729,000 $3,453,000 $5,183,000 33% 67% $2,136,000 $3,047,000 $5,183,000 41% 59% $2,591,000 $2,591,000 $5,183,000 50% 50% $5,183,000 $0 $5,183, % 0% Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

6 Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

7 Tax Rate for Altoona Structures with LVT Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

8 Tax Rate for Altoona Land Value with LVT Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

9 Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

10 EARLY LVT LATE LVT Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

11 EARLY LVT LATE LVT Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

12 Building Permit Changes Average Building Permits From Three Years Before and Three Years After LVT Scranton (1979 LVT Increase) 23% Wilkes-Barre -47% Building Permit Changes Average Building Permits From Three Years Before and Three Years After LVT McKeesport (LVT 1980) 38% Duquesne -20% Clairton -28% Building Permit Changes Average Building Permits From Three Years Before and Three Years After LVT New Castle (LVT 1982) 70% Farrell -66% Sharon -90% Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

13 Per Capita Residential Building Permits Harrisburg, PA and Albany, NY Albany Harrisburg Harrisburg Expands LVT in Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

14 Classic LVT Study: Oates and Schwab, 1997 Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

15 Outreach, Education, Research, Action Thank you. Center for the Study of Economics South 10th Street Philadelphia, PA manager@urbantools.org

16 Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

17 70,000 Building Permits Issued in PA Since ,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 Source: U.S. Census Avg 41,000 Permits ,275 Permits Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

18 1. Infill Directed 2. Compact 3. Dense 4. Affordable Housing 5. Distinctive Communities 6. Mixed Use & Walkable Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

19 1. Infill Directed 2. Compact 3. Dense 4. Affordable Housing 5. Distinctive Communities 6. Mixed Use and Walkable Assessed Value $ mil tax rate $142 a year SQ sq FT ft lot LOT Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

20 Yearly Tax Bill Infill Directed 2. Compact 3. Dense 4. Affordable Housing 5. Distinctive Communities 6. Mixed Use and Walkable Land Value Tax $ Traditional Property Tax $ mil tax rate 85 mil tax rate Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

21 Yearly Tax Bill $710 Rise in holding cost incentivizes land owner to build or sell $ mil tax rate 85 mil tax rate Property with $150,000 building $2720 $710 Building Value 1. Infill Directed 2. Compact 3. Dense 4. Affordable Housing 5. Distinctive Communities 6. Mixed Use and Walkable Decrease in tax bill allows builder/developer to capitalize savings into selling price allowing for higher profit per unit or ability to sell units for less resulting in more units sold Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

22 Yearly Salary $158,600 Mortgage 1. Infill Directed 2. Compact 3. Dense 4. Affordable Housing 5. Distinctive Communities 6. Mixed Use and Walkable $33,400 $40,500 Mortgage Calculator com/tools/mortgage calc/ Salary needed to afford mortgage with traditional property tax Salary needed to afford mortgage with LVT Mortgage Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

23 Additional Tax Bill per Year 500 $15,000 Improvement 1. Infill Directed 2. Compact 3. Dense 4. Affordable Housing 5. Distinctive Communities 6. Mixed Use & Walkable $255/year tax increase Improvement Increase in tax bill after improvement with traditional property tax Increase in tax bill after improvement with LVT Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

24 Average Mixed Use 1. Infill Directed 2. Compact 3. Dense 4. Affordable Housing 5. Distinctive Communities 6. Mixed Use and Walkable Philadelphia Mixed Use Structures Source: Philadelphia BRT Population Density per Block Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

25 1. Infill Directed frees lots for building 2. Compact produce more efficient, consolidated units 3. Dense incentive to build upward with more units 4. Affordable Housing lower incomes qualify for loan 5. Distinctive Communities invest in home without tax increase 6. Mixed Use, Walkable density draws stores, retail Center for the Study of Economics 413 South 10 th Street, Philadelphia, PA

26 Mark Speirs Research Associate ext. 2

27 PA APA Conference Rick Rybeck October 2010

28 Economic Incentives for Sprawl

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33 Infrastructure is created to facilitate development Infrastructure inflates the value of well-served land. Higher land prices chase development to cheaper, more remote sites Infrastructure extended to remote sites Development chased even further away.

34 Can we fund infrastructure in such a way so that: The beneficiaries pay a fair share Development is encouraged adjacent to the infrastructure rather than at more remote locations

35 Equitable & Comprehensible Beneficiaries pay in proportion to the benefit they receive Price Incentives Can Foster Efficiencies Encourage Shorter Trips or Trip Avoidance Encourage Off-Peak Trips Locate Homes & Businesses Closer Together

36 Charging transit users full costs would Reduce transit ridership Increase congestion & pollution

37 General public benefits from Transit: Better Access to employment, shopping, schools & recreation Cleaner Air Lower costs of goods But general benefits not suited to user fees General Taxes Used Instead

38 Fares + General Taxes = Transit Costs

39 Fares + General Taxes < Transit Costs

40 Ridership Traffic Smog Business Opportunities Arising Out of Concentrating People at Transit Stops & Stations

41 Disposable Income & Business Opportunities Quality of Life Resentment Politicians Drivers v Transit Riders

42 Ridership Traffic Smog Business Opportunities

43 Is There an Alternative View That Can

44 In the 1800s, the streets of Washington, DC were mostly unpaved. In wet weather, mud made travel very difficult and unpleasant. Paving streets and sidewalks was a tremendous advance. It made properties more accessible and the air cleaner. Everyone would benefit.

45 Yet, people whose property fronted a paved street would benefit more. No longer would folks track dust, mud and manure into their homes & businesses! Thus, even if they never walked on the new streets, adjacent landowners would benefit financially from them.

46 In 1894, Congress enacted law requiring adjacent property owners to contribute 50% of the cost of first-time paving of streets, gutters, curbs and sidewalks through a special assessment.

47 In the 1800s, Congress required private landowners to pay for 50% of the cost of new transportation infrastructure. In the 1990s, Congress and the District Government were able to obtain a 30% contribution from nearby landowners for a new Metrorail transit station at New York Avenue. Can we do better?

48 In the mid 1990s, there was an old railroad yard just south of National Airport, across the river from Washington, DC. The pension fund that owned it wanted to develop it. Government officials said that development was not possible because the access road, Route 1, was already over capacity during rush hour

49 Officials noted that a rail transit line runs through the middle of this property. IF a transit station was created there, then dense mixed-use development could be allowed without relying solely on Route 1. Landowner did the math: It was cost-effective to pay the entire cost of a new transit station to get development rights!

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51 UNFORTUNATELY... Nearby residents thought that the development was too dense & would bring too much new traffic. They pleaded for Down-Zoning Politicians Listened to Constituents Down-zoned parcel no longer supported enough development to justify a new station.

52 Unable to get zoning permission for mixed-use TOD, landowner sought matter-of-right development. Big Box retail was the answer. Low-density, auto-oriented development generates much more traffic than the TOD would have.

53 If downzoning had not occurred, could this private funding of infrastructure be replicated or was it unique? At Potomac Yards, a single landowner internalized most of the externalities associated with a new transit station. Most of the time, there are many owners. But this does not negate the fact that the value created by public transit can exceed the cost of construction. It only makes it more difficult to collect.

54 Landowners might never drive on a road, or ride a transit vehicle, but they use this infrastructure to extract windfall profits from public investments. Thus, landowners are the invisible users of transportation facilities and services. A Value Capture tax is a user fee that recaptures publicly-created land values in proportion to the benefit received.

55 Successful infrastructure generates higher land rents that are windfalls to landowners who did not create the infrastructure. Landowners are simply lucky enough or shrewd enough to appropriate the value that the infrastructure created. Capturing infrastructure-created value for the entity that created it, can help make infrastructure financially self-sustaining.

56 Value Capture + Traditional User Fees + General Taxes = Facilities & Services

57 Financial Viability An often overlooked revenue stream Equitable & Comprehensible Beneficiaries pay in proportion to the benefit they receive BUT WAIT THERE S MORE!!!

58 User Fees, if properly structured, create incentives for efficiency. Value Capture Can Promote Efficient Land Use Recapturing Land Value Motivates Development Near Infrastructure

59 Development Fee = Tax on Building Value Tax = Cost of Production Cost of Production & Quantity Produced Prices Do we want to reduce development near transit and increase its price? Taxing buildings appropriates private value. It burdens builders & the public.

60 Value Capture = Tax on Land Value Land is NOT Produced Land Tax Cost of Production What s the Impact of Land Tax on Land Price? Price of Land Not Based on Cost Price of Land Based on Expected Benefits

61 Land Tax = Cost of Ownership Cost of Ownership Benefits Price Taxing land does not diminish its quantity and tends to lower its price. Taxing land captures Publicly-Created Values. No burden on private production.

62 Landowner Responses: Avoid the Development Fee Number / size / quality of new buildings Maintenance / improvement of existing buildings Investment in buildings at a lower-tax locations Fund Value Capture Land Tax Cannot be Avoided Location-value of parcel not determined by owner Owner can t move land to a lower-tax location Land will be developed or sold to someone who will

63 Invisible Landowners pay for a substantial benefit. Landowners pay in proportion to benefit received. Value Capture encourages development of high-value land. Instead of chasing development away, value capture draws development to infrastructure -- which is where we want development to occur.

64 What kind of Project? Are the benefits general or localized? Project might create both types of benefits. If localized and traditional user fees are subsidized, the surplus benefits will probably be capitalized into higher land values. Do local assessors determine separate values for buildings and land?

65 Can assessors use regression analysis to determine the proportion of land value created by various public goods & services? Are landowners willing to pay for the benefit they will receive or can they be compelled to do so? Can the public and public officials be educated to understand & support this approach?

66 1669 Columbia Rd, NW, Suite 116 Washington, DC (202)